In defense of objective moral obligations
In this paper, I argue that we have good reasons to posit objective moral obligations, but we lack good reasons to posit subjective moral obligations. Thus, the objectivist view about moral obligations is right, and the subjectivist and sense-splitting views are wrong. In section 1, I introduce the...
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Main Author: | Goh, Esther Hui Fen |
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Other Authors: | Olav Benjamin Vassend |
Format: | Final Year Project |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Nanyang Technological University
2020
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Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/10356/137578 |
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Institution: | Nanyang Technological University |
Language: | English |
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