Real-time optimal energy and reserve management of electric vehicle fast charging station : hierarchical game approach
In this paper, the aggregation of electric vehicles (EVs) and fast charging station (FCS) is modeled as a leader-followers game to provide regulation reserves for power systems. The leader of the game is FCS operator, who manages local sources and sets energy/reserve prices for EVs to increase its r...
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sg-ntu-dr.10356-1397882020-05-21T08:08:35Z Real-time optimal energy and reserve management of electric vehicle fast charging station : hierarchical game approach Zhao, Tianyang Li, Yuanzheng Pan, Xuewei Wang, Peng Zhang, Jianhua School of Electrical and Electronic Engineering Engineering::Electrical and electronic engineering Fast Charging Station Regulation Reserve In this paper, the aggregation of electric vehicles (EVs) and fast charging station (FCS) is modeled as a leader-followers game to provide regulation reserves for power systems. The leader of the game is FCS operator, who manages local sources and sets energy/reserve prices for EVs to increase its revenue, with the consideration of uncertain renewable sources and reserves called by the independent system operator. On the other hand, EVs act as the followers to obtain a tradeoff between the benefits from energy consumption and reserves provision, by deciding their charging and reserve strategies. The proposed game is reformulated as a bi-level optimization problem, which is solved by a mathematical programming with equilibrium constraints method. Furthermore, the existence of Stackelberg equilibriums has been proved. Effectiveness of the proposed game is verified by both single-period and multiple-periods simulation study. Simulation results demonstrate that the proposed game can increase the benefits of FCS operator and EVs simultaneously, compared with the centralized management method. 2020-05-21T08:08:35Z 2020-05-21T08:08:35Z 2017 Journal Article Zhao, T., Li, Y., Pan, X., Wang, P., & Zhang, J. (2018). Real-time optimal energy and reserve management of electric vehicle fast charging station : hierarchical game approach. IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, 9(5), 5357-5370. doi:10.1109/TSG.2017.2687522 1949-3053 https://hdl.handle.net/10356/139788 10.1109/TSG.2017.2687522 2-s2.0-85049380412 5 9 5357 5370 en IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid © 2017 IEEE. All rights reserved. |
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Engineering::Electrical and electronic engineering Fast Charging Station Regulation Reserve Zhao, Tianyang Li, Yuanzheng Pan, Xuewei Wang, Peng Zhang, Jianhua Real-time optimal energy and reserve management of electric vehicle fast charging station : hierarchical game approach |
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In this paper, the aggregation of electric vehicles (EVs) and fast charging station (FCS) is modeled as a leader-followers game to provide regulation reserves for power systems. The leader of the game is FCS operator, who manages local sources and sets energy/reserve prices for EVs to increase its revenue, with the consideration of uncertain renewable sources and reserves called by the independent system operator. On the other hand, EVs act as the followers to obtain a tradeoff between the benefits from energy consumption and reserves provision, by deciding their charging and reserve strategies. The proposed game is reformulated as a bi-level optimization problem, which is solved by a mathematical programming with equilibrium constraints method. Furthermore, the existence of Stackelberg equilibriums has been proved. Effectiveness of the proposed game is verified by both single-period and multiple-periods simulation study. Simulation results demonstrate that the proposed game can increase the benefits of FCS operator and EVs simultaneously, compared with the centralized management method. |
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School of Electrical and Electronic Engineering |
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School of Electrical and Electronic Engineering Zhao, Tianyang Li, Yuanzheng Pan, Xuewei Wang, Peng Zhang, Jianhua |
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Article |
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Zhao, Tianyang Li, Yuanzheng Pan, Xuewei Wang, Peng Zhang, Jianhua |
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Zhao, Tianyang |
title |
Real-time optimal energy and reserve management of electric vehicle fast charging station : hierarchical game approach |
title_short |
Real-time optimal energy and reserve management of electric vehicle fast charging station : hierarchical game approach |
title_full |
Real-time optimal energy and reserve management of electric vehicle fast charging station : hierarchical game approach |
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Real-time optimal energy and reserve management of electric vehicle fast charging station : hierarchical game approach |
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Real-time optimal energy and reserve management of electric vehicle fast charging station : hierarchical game approach |
title_sort |
real-time optimal energy and reserve management of electric vehicle fast charging station : hierarchical game approach |
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2020 |
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https://hdl.handle.net/10356/139788 |
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1681056682026729472 |