On L. W. Sumner’s “Normative ethics and metaethics”
Due largely to the influential work of Ronald Dworkin, there is an ongoing debate concerning the possibility of genuine metaethical theorizing. Those suspicious of the possibility of metaethics argue in two steps. The first step lays down a requirement, namely, neutrality: genuine metaethical theori...
Saved in:
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Other Authors: | |
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
2020
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/10356/142801 |
| Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
| Institution: | Nanyang Technological University |
| Language: | English |
| Summary: | Due largely to the influential work of Ronald Dworkin, there is an ongoing debate concerning the possibility of genuine metaethical theorizing. Those suspicious of the possibility of metaethics argue in two steps. The first step lays down a requirement, namely, neutrality: genuine metaethical theories must avoid having first-order normative commitments. The second step maintains that the nature of metaethical theorizing is such that a breach of neutrality is inevitable. The upshot of violating neutrality is that metaethical theories turn out to be moral theories in disguise. Call this case against metaethics the collapse argument. |
|---|