Information control in the hold-up problem

We study the use of information control to mitigate hold-up risks. We identify a distinction between asymmetric information that creates an ex ante investment incentive and asymmetric information that causes ex post inefficiency, which then allows ex post inefficiency to be eliminated without compro...

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Main Authors:	Nguyen, Anh, Tan, Teck Yong
Other Authors:	School of Social Sciences
Format:	Article
Language:	English
Published:	2020
Subjects:	Social sciences::Economic theory Hold-up Information Control
Online Access:	https://hdl.handle.net/10356/143534
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Institution:	Nanyang Technological University
Language:	English

id	sg-ntu-dr.10356-143534
record_format	dspace
spelling	sg-ntu-dr.10356-1435342020-09-08T01:24:41Z Information control in the hold-up problem Nguyen, Anh Tan, Teck Yong School of Social Sciences Social sciences::Economic theory Hold-up Information Control We study the use of information control to mitigate hold-up risks. We identify a distinction between asymmetric information that creates an ex ante investment incentive and asymmetric information that causes ex post inefficiency, which then allows ex post inefficiency to be eliminated without compromising the ex ante investment incentive. We characterize the properties of the optimal information structure and the payoffs and welfare achievable with information control in the presence of hold-up risks. Accepted version 2020-09-08T01:24:40Z 2020-09-08T01:24:40Z 2019 Journal Article Nguyen, A., & Tan, T. Y. (2019). Information control in the hold‐up problem. The RAND Journal of Economics, 50(4), 768–786. doi:10.1111/1756-2171.12295 0741-6261 https://hdl.handle.net/10356/143534 10.1111/1756-2171.12295 2-s2.0-85072230818 4 50 768 786 en RAND Journal of Economics This is the accepted version of the following article: Nguyen, A., & Tan, T. Y. (2019). Information control in the hold‐up problem. The RAND Journal of Economics, 50(4), 768–786., which has been published in final form at doi:10.1111/1756-2171.12295. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with the Wiley Self-Archiving Policy [https://authorservices.wiley.com/authorresources/Journal-Authors/licensing/self-archiving.html]. application/pdf
institution	Nanyang Technological University
building	NTU Library
country	Singapore
collection	DR-NTU
language	English
topic	Social sciences::Economic theory Hold-up Information Control
spellingShingle	Social sciences::Economic theory Hold-up Information Control Nguyen, Anh Tan, Teck Yong Information control in the hold-up problem
description	We study the use of information control to mitigate hold-up risks. We identify a distinction between asymmetric information that creates an ex ante investment incentive and asymmetric information that causes ex post inefficiency, which then allows ex post inefficiency to be eliminated without compromising the ex ante investment incentive. We characterize the properties of the optimal information structure and the payoffs and welfare achievable with information control in the presence of hold-up risks.
author2	School of Social Sciences
author_facet	School of Social Sciences Nguyen, Anh Tan, Teck Yong
format	Article
author	Nguyen, Anh Tan, Teck Yong
author_sort	Nguyen, Anh
title	Information control in the hold-up problem
title_short	Information control in the hold-up problem
title_full	Information control in the hold-up problem
title_fullStr	Information control in the hold-up problem
title_full_unstemmed	Information control in the hold-up problem
title_sort	information control in the hold-up problem
publishDate	2020
url	https://hdl.handle.net/10356/143534
_version_	1681056116537032704

Information control in the hold-up problem

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