A Stackelberg game approach toward socially-aware incentive mechanisms for mobile crowdsensing
Mobile crowdsensing has shown great potential in addressing large-scale data sensing problems by allocating sensing tasks to pervasive mobile users. The mobile users will participate in a crowdsensing platform if they can receive a satisfactory reward. In this paper, to effectively and efficiently r...
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sg-ntu-dr.10356-1445952021-01-14T08:39:56Z A Stackelberg game approach toward socially-aware incentive mechanisms for mobile crowdsensing Nie, Jiangtian Luo, Jun Xiong, Zehui Niyato, Dusit Wang, Ping School of Computer Science and Engineering Interdisciplinary Graduate School (IGS) Energy Research Institute @ NTU (ERI@N) Engineering::Computer science and engineering Crowdsensing Social Network Effects Mobile crowdsensing has shown great potential in addressing large-scale data sensing problems by allocating sensing tasks to pervasive mobile users. The mobile users will participate in a crowdsensing platform if they can receive a satisfactory reward. In this paper, to effectively and efficiently recruit a sufficient number of mobile users, i.e., participants, we investigate an optimal incentive mechanism of a crowdsensing service provider. We apply a two-stage Stackelberg game to analyze the participation level of the mobile users and the optimal incentive mechanism of the crowdsensing service provider using backward induction. In order to motivate the participants, the incentive mechanism is designed by taking into account the social network effects from the underlying mobile social domain. We derive the analytical expressions for the discriminatory incentive as well as the uniform incentive mechanisms. To fit into practical scenarios, we further formulate a Bayesian Stackelberg game with incomplete information to analyze the interaction between the crowdsensing service provider and mobile users, where the social structure information, i.e., the social network effects, is uncertain. The existence and uniqueness of the Bayesian Stackelberg equilibrium is analytically validated by identifying the best response strategies of the mobile users. The numerical results corroborate the fact that the network effects significantly stimulate a higher mobile participation level and greater revenue for the crowdsensing service provider. In addition, the social structure information helps the crowdsensing service provider achieve greater revenue gain. Energy Market Authority (EMA) Ministry of Education (MOE) Nanyang Technological University National Research Foundation (NRF) Accepted version This work was supported in part by the National Research Foundation, Prime Minister’s Office, Singapore, under its Energy NIC Grant (NRF) under Grant NRF-ENIC-SERTD-SMES-NTUJTCI3C-2016,in part by AcRF Tier2 under Grant MOE2016-T2-2-022, in part by WASP/NTU, Singapore, under Grant M4082187 (4080), in part by MOE Tier1 under Grant 2017-T1-002-007 RG122/17, in part by MOE Tier2 under Grant MOE2014-T2-2-015 ARC4/15, in part by NRF2015-NRF-ISF001-2277,and in part by EMA Energy Resilience under Grant NRF2017EWT-EP003-041. 2020-11-13T08:29:02Z 2020-11-13T08:29:02Z 2018 Journal Article Nie, J., Luo, J., Xiong, Z., Niyato, D., & Wang, P. (2019). A Stackelberg game approach toward socially-aware incentive mechanisms for mobile crowdsensing. IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications, 18(1), 724-738. doi:10.1109/twc.2018.2885747 1536-1276 https://hdl.handle.net/10356/144595 10.1109/TWC.2018.2885747 1 18 724 738 en IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications © 2018 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other uses, in any current or future media, including reprinting/republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works, for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted component of this work in other works. The published version is available at: https://doi.org/10.1109/TWC.2018.2885747. application/pdf |
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Engineering::Computer science and engineering Crowdsensing Social Network Effects Nie, Jiangtian Luo, Jun Xiong, Zehui Niyato, Dusit Wang, Ping A Stackelberg game approach toward socially-aware incentive mechanisms for mobile crowdsensing |
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Mobile crowdsensing has shown great potential in addressing large-scale data sensing problems by allocating sensing tasks to pervasive mobile users. The mobile users will participate in a crowdsensing platform if they can receive a satisfactory reward. In this paper, to effectively and efficiently recruit a sufficient number of mobile users, i.e., participants, we investigate an optimal incentive mechanism of a crowdsensing service provider. We apply a two-stage Stackelberg game to analyze the participation level of the mobile users and the optimal incentive mechanism of the crowdsensing service provider using backward induction. In order to motivate the participants, the incentive mechanism is designed by taking into account the social network effects from the underlying mobile social domain. We derive the analytical expressions for the discriminatory incentive as well as the uniform incentive mechanisms. To fit into practical scenarios, we further formulate a Bayesian Stackelberg game with incomplete information to analyze the interaction between the crowdsensing service provider and mobile users, where the social structure information, i.e., the social network effects, is uncertain. The existence and uniqueness of the Bayesian Stackelberg equilibrium is analytically validated by identifying the best response strategies of the mobile users. The numerical results corroborate the fact that the network effects significantly stimulate a higher mobile participation level and greater revenue for the crowdsensing service provider. In addition, the social structure information helps the crowdsensing service provider achieve greater revenue gain. |
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School of Computer Science and Engineering |
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School of Computer Science and Engineering Nie, Jiangtian Luo, Jun Xiong, Zehui Niyato, Dusit Wang, Ping |
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Article |
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Nie, Jiangtian Luo, Jun Xiong, Zehui Niyato, Dusit Wang, Ping |
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Nie, Jiangtian |
title |
A Stackelberg game approach toward socially-aware incentive mechanisms for mobile crowdsensing |
title_short |
A Stackelberg game approach toward socially-aware incentive mechanisms for mobile crowdsensing |
title_full |
A Stackelberg game approach toward socially-aware incentive mechanisms for mobile crowdsensing |
title_fullStr |
A Stackelberg game approach toward socially-aware incentive mechanisms for mobile crowdsensing |
title_full_unstemmed |
A Stackelberg game approach toward socially-aware incentive mechanisms for mobile crowdsensing |
title_sort |
stackelberg game approach toward socially-aware incentive mechanisms for mobile crowdsensing |
publishDate |
2020 |
url |
https://hdl.handle.net/10356/144595 |
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1690658328778113024 |