Xin : being trustworthy
This essay analyses the Confucian conception of xin 信, an attribute that broadly resembles what we would ordinarily call trustworthiness. More specifically, it focuses on providing an analysis of the psychology of someone who is xin and highlighting a feature of the Confucian conception of trustwort...
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sg-ntu-dr.10356-1448912023-03-11T20:05:57Z Xin : being trustworthy Sung, Winnie School of Humanities Humanities::Philosophy Trustworthiness Confucian Moral Psychology This essay analyses the Confucian conception of xin 信, an attribute that broadly resembles what we would ordinarily call trustworthiness. More specifically, it focuses on providing an analysis of the psychology of someone who is xin and highlighting a feature of the Confucian conception of trustworthiness, namely, the trustworthy has to ensure that there is a match between her self-presentation and the way she is. My goal is not to argue against any of the existing accounts of trustworthiness, but to draw on Confucian insights to shed light on features of trustworthiness that are overlooked in current discussions. I hope to show that the Confucian conception of trustworthiness emphasises more on how the trustworthy actively tries to make sure another’s dependency on her is not unwarranted, rather than how the trustworthy responds to the trustor. Accepted version 2020-12-02T06:52:17Z 2020-12-02T06:52:17Z 2020 Journal Article Sung, W. (2020). Xin : being trustworthy. International Philosophical Quarterly, 60(3), 271-286. doi:10.5840/ipq2020715151 0019-0365 https://hdl.handle.net/10356/144891 10.5840/ipq2020715151 3 60 271 286 en International Philosophical Quarterly © 2020 Foundation for International Philosophical Exchange. All rights reserved. This paper was published in International Philosophical Quarterly and is made available with permission of Foundation for International Philosophical Exchange. application/pdf |
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This essay analyses the Confucian conception of xin 信, an attribute that broadly resembles what we would ordinarily call trustworthiness. More specifically, it focuses on providing an analysis of the psychology of someone who is xin and highlighting a feature of the Confucian conception of trustworthiness, namely, the trustworthy has to ensure that there is a match between her self-presentation and the way she is. My goal is not to argue against any of the existing accounts of trustworthiness, but to draw on Confucian insights to shed light on features of trustworthiness that are overlooked in current discussions. I hope to show that the Confucian conception of trustworthiness emphasises more on how the trustworthy actively tries to make sure another’s dependency on her is not unwarranted, rather than how the trustworthy responds to the trustor. |
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Xin : being trustworthy |
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Xin : being trustworthy |
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Xin : being trustworthy |
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xin : being trustworthy |
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