Public reason, compromise within consensus, and legitimacy
A central idea of public reason liberalism is that the exercise of political power is legitimate when supported only by reasons which all citizens accept. Public reason serves as a necessary standard for evaluating the legitimacy of political decisions. In this paper, I examine the directive to empl...
محفوظ في:
| المؤلف الرئيسي: | |
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| مؤلفون آخرون: | |
| التنسيق: | فصل الكتاب |
| اللغة: | English |
| منشور في: |
De Gruyter
2020
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| الموضوعات: | |
| الوصول للمادة أونلاين: | https://hdl.handle.net/10356/145141 |
| الوسوم: |
إضافة وسم
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| الملخص: | A central idea of public reason liberalism is that the exercise of political power is legitimate when supported only by reasons which all citizens accept. Public reason serves as a necessary standard for evaluating the legitimacy of political decisions. In this paper, I examine the directive to employ public reason, from citizens’ perspective. I suggest that employing public reason potentially involves them engaging in different types of compromise. I consider how acknowledging these compromises sheds light on public reason liberalism. Public reason may not offer a necessary standard for evaluating the legitimacy of decisions, and the evaluation it offers may not have great weight relative to other moral and political considerations. |
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