Public reason, compromise within consensus, and legitimacy
A central idea of public reason liberalism is that the exercise of political power is legitimate when supported only by reasons which all citizens accept. Public reason serves as a necessary standard for evaluating the legitimacy of political decisions. In this paper, I examine the directive to empl...
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sg-ntu-dr.10356-1451412023-03-11T20:04:39Z Public reason, compromise within consensus, and legitimacy Lim, Chong-Ming Knoll, Manuel Snyder, Stephen Şimsek, Nurdane School of Humanities Humanities::Philosophy Public Reason Political Liberalism A central idea of public reason liberalism is that the exercise of political power is legitimate when supported only by reasons which all citizens accept. Public reason serves as a necessary standard for evaluating the legitimacy of political decisions. In this paper, I examine the directive to employ public reason, from citizens’ perspective. I suggest that employing public reason potentially involves them engaging in different types of compromise. I consider how acknowledging these compromises sheds light on public reason liberalism. Public reason may not offer a necessary standard for evaluating the legitimacy of decisions, and the evaluation it offers may not have great weight relative to other moral and political considerations. Accepted version 2020-12-14T02:39:27Z 2020-12-14T02:39:27Z 2018 Book Chapter Lim, C.-M. (2018). Public reason, compromise within consensus, and legitimacy. In Knoll, M., Snyder, S., & Şimsek, N. (Eds.), New Perspectives on Distributive Justice : Deep Disagreements, Pluralism, and the Problem of Consensus (pp. 225-242). De Gruyter. doi:10.1515/9783110537369-015 9783110537369 https://hdl.handle.net/10356/145141 10.1515/9783110537369-015 225 242 en New Perspectives on Distributive Justice : Deep Disagreements, Pluralism, and the Problem of Consensus © 2018 Walter de Gruyter GmbH. All rights reserved. This book chapter is made available with permission of Walter de Gruyter GmbH. application/pdf De Gruyter |
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Humanities::Philosophy Public Reason Political Liberalism Lim, Chong-Ming Public reason, compromise within consensus, and legitimacy |
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A central idea of public reason liberalism is that the exercise of political power is legitimate when supported only by reasons which all citizens accept. Public reason serves as a necessary standard for evaluating the legitimacy of political decisions. In this paper, I examine the directive to employ public reason, from citizens’ perspective. I suggest that employing public reason potentially involves them engaging in different types of compromise. I consider how acknowledging these compromises sheds light on public reason liberalism. Public reason may not offer a necessary standard for evaluating the legitimacy of decisions, and the evaluation it offers may not have great weight relative to other moral and political considerations. |
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Knoll, Manuel |
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Knoll, Manuel Lim, Chong-Ming |
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Book Chapter |
author |
Lim, Chong-Ming |
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Lim, Chong-Ming |
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Public reason, compromise within consensus, and legitimacy |
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Public reason, compromise within consensus, and legitimacy |
title_full |
Public reason, compromise within consensus, and legitimacy |
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Public reason, compromise within consensus, and legitimacy |
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Public reason, compromise within consensus, and legitimacy |
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public reason, compromise within consensus, and legitimacy |
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De Gruyter |
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2020 |
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https://hdl.handle.net/10356/145141 |
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