Effects of auditors' concession timing on financial officers' negotiation judgements.

• Main Authors: Tan, Hun Tong., Trotman, Ken.
• Other Authors: Nanyang Business School
• Format: Research Report
• Language: English
• Published: 2008
• Subjects: DRNTU::Business::Auditing
• Online Access: http://hdl.handle.net/10356/14556
• Institution: Nanyang Technological University

In this paper, we develop and test a conceptual model that posits how the timing of concessions made by an auditor to a client influences negotiation judgments. We conduct an experiment to investigate how financial officers’ negotiation-related judgments are influenced by negotiation strategies employed by auditors. We manipulate between-subjects four negotiation strategies that vary the timing of the concessions given, holding constant the total amount of concessions given. These concessions vary in terms of whether they are given before the start of the negotiation, after one round of negotiation, gradually during the negotiation, or at the end of the negotiation. In our experiment, financial officers negotiate with a hypothetical auditor over four rounds of negotiation. Our results support the use of giving gradual or delayed concessions, compared to giving concessions early in the negotiation process. Our results are consistent with a mediation model in which auditors’ negotiation strategies influence financial officers’ offers (given in the round just before the auditor makes a final decision), which affects their satisfaction with the negotiation outcome, and which, in turn, affects their intention to continue their relationship with the auditor. We also provide evidence on the strategies used by financial officers. Keywords: auditor-client negotiations, financial officers, negotiation strategy, concessions Data availability: Contact authors