从新自由主义合作理论探讨《反分裂国家法》对两岸关系的影响 = Impact of anti-secession law on the cross-strait relations : from the perspective of neo-liberalism and theory of cooperation

《反分裂国家法》(以下简称《反》)自2005年3月14日生效后,针对该法对两岸关系有何影响,两岸学者的意见一直难以同调。本文立意摆脱过往研究中一贯执着的主权(统独)与人权(“民族自决原则”)话语,而以传统的历史研究法结合行为分析为纲,以行为主体属性、行为主体互动模式为主轴,对《反》进行研究,重新剖析出《反》如何实际与潜在地影响中台这两个行为主体。具体而言,本文拟从国际政治学中的新自由主义此一宏观理论出发,再借助博弈理论与合作理论两支与新自由主义相辅相成的微观理论,架构出总体分析框架。其后,再将《反》与两岸关系置入上述框架进行分析,而中台双方被定义为自主的理性行为主体,两岸互动则被视为双方博弈。...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: 苏韦骏 Soo, Wee Chun
Other Authors: Liu Hsiaopong Philip
Format: Final Year Project
Language:Chinese
Published: 2009
Subjects:
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/10356/14995
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Institution: Nanyang Technological University
Language: Chinese
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Summary:《反分裂国家法》(以下简称《反》)自2005年3月14日生效后,针对该法对两岸关系有何影响,两岸学者的意见一直难以同调。本文立意摆脱过往研究中一贯执着的主权(统独)与人权(“民族自决原则”)话语,而以传统的历史研究法结合行为分析为纲,以行为主体属性、行为主体互动模式为主轴,对《反》进行研究,重新剖析出《反》如何实际与潜在地影响中台这两个行为主体。具体而言,本文拟从国际政治学中的新自由主义此一宏观理论出发,再借助博弈理论与合作理论两支与新自由主义相辅相成的微观理论,架构出总体分析框架。其后,再将《反》与两岸关系置入上述框架进行分析,而中台双方被定义为自主的理性行为主体,两岸互动则被视为双方博弈。从中,本文将分析两岸如何基于理性,采取可能的决策,以因应《反》颁行后的新情势。而这种可能出现的决策变化,将如何改善两岸政治上益发失去互信的沟通,再增进两岸经文上的合作。综上所述,本文根据国际政治学理论、中方既有的对台政策、《反》制定的缘由与条文释义,以及对中台各自的利益与彼此的冲突分析,再结合《反》出台前后中台互动的实际状态,探讨《反》在两岸规避冲突、改善沟通、增进合作三大方面,在当下起了怎样的作用,对未来又有何影响。This thesis aims to analyze the practical and potential effect of the Anti-Secession Law on the cross-Strait relations between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan. There have been disagreements among the researchers from both PRC and Taiwan regarding the effects of Anti-Secession Law since it became effective on 14th March 2005, due to the contradictory political standpoints and different perceptions on Self-determination (which is part of the human rights). In order to break through the ceaseless controversy, this paper proposes a new analytical approach on the Anti-Secession Law, by combining the conventional-structural analysis of history and behavioral analysis of politics. Instead of over-emphasizing the conflict between PRC and Taiwan, this paper focuses on analyzing the attributes of these two international-politics participation main bodies, and trying to explain how Anti-Secession Law will and may influence the political behavior and interaction between both of them. Concretely speaking, this article founds the analytical framework by applying the hypothesis of Neo-Liberalism, and finalizes the framework by integrating the Game Theory and Theory of Cooperation. The PRC and Taiwan will then be defined as independent-rational main bodies (or “players” in game), while the cross-Strait interactions will be treated as games. By affirming the strategic contingency, the progress of possible adjustments on cross-Strait policies from both main bodies based on their strategic rationality after the issue of Anti-Secession Law will be figured out.