Institutional shareholders and corporate social responsibility

This study uses two distinct quasi-natural experiments to examine the effect of institutional shareholders on corporate social responsibility (CSR). We first find that an exogenous increase in institutional holding caused by Russell Index reconstitutions improves portfolio firms’ CSR performance. We...

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Main Authors: Chen, Tao, Dong, Hui, Lin, Chen
Other Authors: Nanyang Business School
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: 2021
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Online Access:https://hdl.handle.net/10356/150417
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Institution: Nanyang Technological University
Language: English
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spelling sg-ntu-dr.10356-1504172023-05-19T07:31:15Z Institutional shareholders and corporate social responsibility Chen, Tao Dong, Hui Lin, Chen Nanyang Business School Business::General Institutional Ownership Indexing This study uses two distinct quasi-natural experiments to examine the effect of institutional shareholders on corporate social responsibility (CSR). We first find that an exogenous increase in institutional holding caused by Russell Index reconstitutions improves portfolio firms’ CSR performance. We then find that firms have lower CSR ratings when shareholders are distracted due to exogenous shocks. Moreover, the effect of institutional ownership is stronger in CSR categories that are financially material. Furthermore, we show that institutional shareholders influence CSR through CSR-related proposals. Overall, our results suggest that institutional shareholders can generate real social impact. Accepted version 2021-05-24T06:23:31Z 2021-05-24T06:23:31Z 2019 Journal Article Chen, T., Dong, H. & Lin, C. (2019). Institutional shareholders and corporate social responsibility. Journal of Financial Economics, 135(2), 483-504. https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2019.06.007 0304-405X https://hdl.handle.net/10356/150417 10.1016/j.jfineco.2019.06.007 2-s2.0-85068439438 2 135 483 504 en Journal of Financial Economics © 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. This paper was published in Journal of Financial Economics and is made available with permission of Elsevier B.V. application/pdf
institution Nanyang Technological University
building NTU Library
continent Asia
country Singapore
Singapore
content_provider NTU Library
collection DR-NTU
language English
topic Business::General
Institutional Ownership
Indexing
spellingShingle Business::General
Institutional Ownership
Indexing
Chen, Tao
Dong, Hui
Lin, Chen
Institutional shareholders and corporate social responsibility
description This study uses two distinct quasi-natural experiments to examine the effect of institutional shareholders on corporate social responsibility (CSR). We first find that an exogenous increase in institutional holding caused by Russell Index reconstitutions improves portfolio firms’ CSR performance. We then find that firms have lower CSR ratings when shareholders are distracted due to exogenous shocks. Moreover, the effect of institutional ownership is stronger in CSR categories that are financially material. Furthermore, we show that institutional shareholders influence CSR through CSR-related proposals. Overall, our results suggest that institutional shareholders can generate real social impact.
author2 Nanyang Business School
author_facet Nanyang Business School
Chen, Tao
Dong, Hui
Lin, Chen
format Article
author Chen, Tao
Dong, Hui
Lin, Chen
author_sort Chen, Tao
title Institutional shareholders and corporate social responsibility
title_short Institutional shareholders and corporate social responsibility
title_full Institutional shareholders and corporate social responsibility
title_fullStr Institutional shareholders and corporate social responsibility
title_full_unstemmed Institutional shareholders and corporate social responsibility
title_sort institutional shareholders and corporate social responsibility
publishDate 2021
url https://hdl.handle.net/10356/150417
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