Noncompliance with safety guidelines as a free-riding strategy : an evolutionary game-theoretic approach to cooperation during the COVID-19 pandemic
Evolutionary game theory and public goods games offer an important framework to understand cooperation during pandemics. From this perspective, the COVID-19 situation can be conceptualized as a dilemma where people who neglect safety precautions act as free riders, because they get to enjoy the bene...
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Main Authors: | Yong, Jose C., Choy, Bryan K. C. |
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其他作者: | Nanyang Business School |
格式: | Article |
語言: | English |
出版: |
2021
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在線閱讀: | https://hdl.handle.net/10356/152044 |
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