Protecting elections by recounting ballots

• Main Authors: Elkind, Edith, Gan, Jiarui, Obraztsova, Svetlana, Rabinovich, Zinovi, Voudouris, Alexandros A.
• Other Authors: School of Computer Science and Engineering
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Published: 2021
• Subjects: Engineering::Computer science and engineering; Election Recounting; Voting Manipulation
• Online Access: https://hdl.handle.net/10356/152074
• Institution: Nanyang Technological University

Complexity of voting manipulation is a prominent topic in computational social choice. In this work, we consider a two-stage voting manipulation scenario. First, a malicious party (an attacker) attempts to manipulate the election outcome in favor of a preferred candidate by changing the vote counts in some of the voting districts. Afterwards, another party (a defender), which cares about the voters' wishes, demands a recount in a subset of the manipulated districts, restoring their vote counts to their original values. We investigate the resulting Stackelberg game for the case where votes are aggregated using two variants of the Plurality rule, and obtain an almost complete picture of the complexity landscape, both from the attacker's and from the defender's perspective.