Hedonic and non-hedonic bias toward the future
It has widely been assumed, by philosophers, that our first-person preferences regarding pleasurable and painful experiences exhibit a bias toward the future (positive and negative hedonic future-bias), and that our preferences regarding non-hedonic events (both positive and negative) exhibit no suc...
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sg-ntu-dr.10356-1520752021-09-01T06:52:57Z Hedonic and non-hedonic bias toward the future Greene, Preston Latham, Andrew J. Miller, Kristie Norton, James School of Humanities Humanities::Philosophy Time Bias Bias Toward The Future It has widely been assumed, by philosophers, that our first-person preferences regarding pleasurable and painful experiences exhibit a bias toward the future (positive and negative hedonic future-bias), and that our preferences regarding non-hedonic events (both positive and negative) exhibit no such bias (non-hedonic time-neutrality). Further, it has been assumed that our third-person preferences are always time-neutral. Some have attempted to use these (presumed) differential patterns of future-bias—different across kinds of events and perspectives—to argue for the irrationality of hedonic future-bias. This paper experimentally tests these descriptive hypotheses. While, as predicted, we found first-person hedonic future-bias, we did not find that participants were time-neutral in all other conditions. Hence, the presumed asymmetry of hedonic/non-hedonic and first/third-person preferences cannot be used to argue for the irrationality of future-bias, since no such asymmetries exist. Instead, we develop a more fine-grained approach, according to which three factors—positive/negative valence, first/third-person, and hedonic/non-hedonic—each independently influence, but do not determine, whether an event is treated in a future-biased or a time-neutral way. We discuss the upshots of these results for the debate over the rationality of future-bias. Ministry of Education (MOE) Kristie Miler would like to thank the Australian Research Council (FT170100262 and DP180100105) for providing funding for this work. James Norton would like to thank the Icelandic Centre for Research (195617-051). Andrew J. Latham would like to thank the Ngāi Tai Ki Tāmaki Tribal Trust. Preston Greene would like to thank the Singapore Ministry of Education Academic Research Fund Tier 1. 2021-09-01T06:52:56Z 2021-09-01T06:52:56Z 2020 Journal Article Greene, P., Latham, A. J., Miller, K. & Norton, J. (2020). Hedonic and non-hedonic bias toward the future. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 99(1), 148-163. https://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2019.1703017 0004-8402 https://hdl.handle.net/10356/152075 10.1080/00048402.2019.1703017 2-s2.0-85082434966 1 99 148 163 en Australasian Journal of Philosophy © 2020 Australasian Journal of Philosophy. All rights reserved. |
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Humanities::Philosophy Time Bias Bias Toward The Future Greene, Preston Latham, Andrew J. Miller, Kristie Norton, James Hedonic and non-hedonic bias toward the future |
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It has widely been assumed, by philosophers, that our first-person preferences regarding pleasurable and painful experiences exhibit a bias toward the future (positive and negative hedonic future-bias), and that our preferences regarding non-hedonic events (both positive and negative) exhibit no such bias (non-hedonic time-neutrality). Further, it has been assumed that our third-person preferences are always time-neutral. Some have attempted to use these (presumed) differential patterns of future-bias—different across kinds of events and perspectives—to argue for the irrationality of hedonic future-bias. This paper experimentally tests these descriptive hypotheses. While, as predicted, we found first-person hedonic future-bias, we did not find that participants were time-neutral in all other conditions. Hence, the presumed asymmetry of hedonic/non-hedonic and first/third-person preferences cannot be used to argue for the irrationality of future-bias, since no such asymmetries exist. Instead, we develop a more fine-grained approach, according to which three factors—positive/negative valence, first/third-person, and hedonic/non-hedonic—each independently influence, but do not determine, whether an event is treated in a future-biased or a time-neutral way. We discuss the upshots of these results for the debate over the rationality of future-bias. |
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School of Humanities |
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School of Humanities Greene, Preston Latham, Andrew J. Miller, Kristie Norton, James |
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Greene, Preston Latham, Andrew J. Miller, Kristie Norton, James |
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Greene, Preston |
title |
Hedonic and non-hedonic bias toward the future |
title_short |
Hedonic and non-hedonic bias toward the future |
title_full |
Hedonic and non-hedonic bias toward the future |
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Hedonic and non-hedonic bias toward the future |
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Hedonic and non-hedonic bias toward the future |
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hedonic and non-hedonic bias toward the future |
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2021 |
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https://hdl.handle.net/10356/152075 |
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1710686917625905152 |