An extremum seeking-based approach for Nash equilibrium seeking in N-cluster noncooperative games

This paper considers Nash equilibrium seeking for N-cluster noncooperative games in which the explicit expressions of the agents’ local objective functions are not available to the agents. As an alternative, the output values of the agents’ local objective functions are supposed to be measurable. An...

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Main Authors: Ye, Maojiao, Hu, Guoqiang, Xu, Shengyuan
Other Authors: School of Electrical and Electronic Engineering
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: 2021
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Online Access:https://hdl.handle.net/10356/152097
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Institution: Nanyang Technological University
Language: English
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spelling sg-ntu-dr.10356-1520972021-09-08T01:40:41Z An extremum seeking-based approach for Nash equilibrium seeking in N-cluster noncooperative games Ye, Maojiao Hu, Guoqiang Xu, Shengyuan School of Electrical and Electronic Engineering Engineering::Electrical and electronic engineering Nash Equilibrium Seeking Extremum Seeking Control This paper considers Nash equilibrium seeking for N-cluster noncooperative games in which the explicit expressions of the agents’ local objective functions are not available to the agents. As an alternative, the output values of the agents’ local objective functions are supposed to be measurable. An extremum seeker is designed to achieve the Nash equilibrium seeking for the N-cluster noncooperative games. The design of the extremum seeker is based on a dynamic average consensus protocol and the modulation of the sinusoidal dither signals. Through Lyapunov stability analysis, the convergence results are analytically studied. Local and nonlocal convergence results are derived under local and global characterizations of the Nash equilibrium for the N-cluster noncooperative games, respectively. Compared with our previous works on Nash equilibrium seeking for the N-cluster noncooperative games, the main advantages and characteristics of the proposed method are threefold. Firstly, the proposed method broadens the applicability of the existing Nash equilibrium seeking strategies to circumstances in which the agents cannot access the explicit expressions of their local objective functions. Moreover, the proposed seeking strategy performs as a unified strategy that solves the noncooperative games and the social cost minimization problems without utilizing explicit model information. Secondly, the proposed seeking strategy requires each agent to update fewer auxiliary variables compared with the existing methods and hence reduces the communication and computation costs. Thirdly, different from most of the existing works that adopt singular perturbation to analyze the stability of extremum seekers, this paper establishes the convergence results via Lyapunov stability analysis, which is novel and provides some new insights on the analysis of extremum seekers. A numerical example is provided to verify the effectiveness of the proposed method. Economic Development Board (EDB) This work was supported by Singapore Economic Development Board under EIRP grant S14-1172-NRF EIRP-IHL, the National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC), No. 61803202, 61673215, the Natural Science Foundation of Jiangsu Province, China, No. BK20180455, the 333 Project, China (BRA2017380) and the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities, China , No. 30918011332. 2021-09-08T01:40:41Z 2021-09-08T01:40:41Z 2020 Journal Article Ye, M., Hu, G. & Xu, S. (2020). An extremum seeking-based approach for Nash equilibrium seeking in N-cluster noncooperative games. Automatica, 114, 108815-. https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.automatica.2020.108815 0005-1098 https://hdl.handle.net/10356/152097 10.1016/j.automatica.2020.108815 2-s2.0-85078059558 114 108815 en S14-1172-NRF EIRP-IHL Automatica © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
institution Nanyang Technological University
building NTU Library
continent Asia
country Singapore
Singapore
content_provider NTU Library
collection DR-NTU
language English
topic Engineering::Electrical and electronic engineering
Nash Equilibrium Seeking
Extremum Seeking Control
spellingShingle Engineering::Electrical and electronic engineering
Nash Equilibrium Seeking
Extremum Seeking Control
Ye, Maojiao
Hu, Guoqiang
Xu, Shengyuan
An extremum seeking-based approach for Nash equilibrium seeking in N-cluster noncooperative games
description This paper considers Nash equilibrium seeking for N-cluster noncooperative games in which the explicit expressions of the agents’ local objective functions are not available to the agents. As an alternative, the output values of the agents’ local objective functions are supposed to be measurable. An extremum seeker is designed to achieve the Nash equilibrium seeking for the N-cluster noncooperative games. The design of the extremum seeker is based on a dynamic average consensus protocol and the modulation of the sinusoidal dither signals. Through Lyapunov stability analysis, the convergence results are analytically studied. Local and nonlocal convergence results are derived under local and global characterizations of the Nash equilibrium for the N-cluster noncooperative games, respectively. Compared with our previous works on Nash equilibrium seeking for the N-cluster noncooperative games, the main advantages and characteristics of the proposed method are threefold. Firstly, the proposed method broadens the applicability of the existing Nash equilibrium seeking strategies to circumstances in which the agents cannot access the explicit expressions of their local objective functions. Moreover, the proposed seeking strategy performs as a unified strategy that solves the noncooperative games and the social cost minimization problems without utilizing explicit model information. Secondly, the proposed seeking strategy requires each agent to update fewer auxiliary variables compared with the existing methods and hence reduces the communication and computation costs. Thirdly, different from most of the existing works that adopt singular perturbation to analyze the stability of extremum seekers, this paper establishes the convergence results via Lyapunov stability analysis, which is novel and provides some new insights on the analysis of extremum seekers. A numerical example is provided to verify the effectiveness of the proposed method.
author2 School of Electrical and Electronic Engineering
author_facet School of Electrical and Electronic Engineering
Ye, Maojiao
Hu, Guoqiang
Xu, Shengyuan
format Article
author Ye, Maojiao
Hu, Guoqiang
Xu, Shengyuan
author_sort Ye, Maojiao
title An extremum seeking-based approach for Nash equilibrium seeking in N-cluster noncooperative games
title_short An extremum seeking-based approach for Nash equilibrium seeking in N-cluster noncooperative games
title_full An extremum seeking-based approach for Nash equilibrium seeking in N-cluster noncooperative games
title_fullStr An extremum seeking-based approach for Nash equilibrium seeking in N-cluster noncooperative games
title_full_unstemmed An extremum seeking-based approach for Nash equilibrium seeking in N-cluster noncooperative games
title_sort extremum seeking-based approach for nash equilibrium seeking in n-cluster noncooperative games
publishDate 2021
url https://hdl.handle.net/10356/152097
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