The U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy and its implications for U.S.-ASEAN economic governance architecture

During his visit to Asia in November 2017, President Donald Trump announced his vision of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” as the U.S. approach to the region. The Department of State unveiled in detail the economic elements of the Indo-Pacific strategy in April 2018. These economic policies were reite...

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Main Author: Pitakdumrongkit, Kaewkamol
Other Authors: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: 2021
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Online Access:https://keia.org/contributor/kaewkamol-pitakdumrongkit/
https://hdl.handle.net/10356/152666
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Institution: Nanyang Technological University
Language: English
id sg-ntu-dr.10356-152666
record_format dspace
institution Nanyang Technological University
building NTU Library
continent Asia
country Singapore
Singapore
content_provider NTU Library
collection DR-NTU
language English
topic Social sciences::Political science
Indo-Pacific Strategy
Economic
spellingShingle Social sciences::Political science
Indo-Pacific Strategy
Economic
Pitakdumrongkit, Kaewkamol
The U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy and its implications for U.S.-ASEAN economic governance architecture
description During his visit to Asia in November 2017, President Donald Trump announced his vision of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” as the U.S. approach to the region. The Department of State unveiled in detail the economic elements of the Indo-Pacific strategy in April 2018. These economic policies were reiterated by Vice President Mike Pence at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) CEO Summit in Papua New Guinea in November 2018. For instance, Pence maintained that Washington plans to “make bilateral trade agreements with any Indo-Pacific nation that wants to be our partner and that will abide by the principles of fair and reciprocal trade,” promote private sector investment, and assist regional states on sustainable infrastructure development. On December 31, Trump signed into law the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act (ARIA) passed by the U.S. Congress earlier that month. ARIA further advances the strategy by mandating the executive branch to “develop a long-term strategic vision and a comprehensive, multifaceted, and principled United States policy for the Indo-Pacific region.” Moreover, the text authorizes $1.5 billion to “the Department of State, United States Agency for International Development [USAID], and, as appropriate, the Department of Defense . . . for each of the fiscal years 2019 through 2023, which shall be used” to achieve several objectives including ensuring “the regulatory environments for trade, infrastructure, and investment in partner countries are transparent, open, and free of corruption.” Against this backdrop, this chapter examines the effects of the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy on the future of U.S.-ASEAN economic governance architecture. “Strategy” refers to “the collection of plans and policies that comprise the state’s deliberate effort to harness political, military, diplomatic, and economic tools together to advance that state’s national interest.” Such a study is warranted for a few reasons. First, the jury is still out on the degree to which this strategy would align or clash with different approaches and policies supported by Southeast Asian governments. Clashes of ideas and policies can result in not only failed implementation of the U.S. strategy but also competing economic initiatives which could undermine the future of U.S.-ASEAN trade and investment ties. Therefore, this research is aimed at: 1) assessing how the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy would interact with Southeast Asian nations’ policies to shape the future development of regional economic architectures, and 2) forging policy recommendations for the U.S. and ASEAN governments on how they could jointly pursue regional economic institution-building. The questions I explore include: 1) What are the economic components of the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy? 2) How will this strategy and Southeast Asian countries’ economic agendas/policies interact to shape the future advancement of regional economic architecture? and 3) What should American and ASEAN governments do to foster cooperation and lessen conflict among their different policies regarding economic regionalism? The chapter is organized as follows. The next part discusses the economic components of the Indo-Pacific strategy under the Trump administration. The second section examines the interactions between this strategy and the economic agendas of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to highlight the areas of complementarities and clashes. The last section provides policy recommendations for American and Southeast Asian governments to augment synergies and ameliorate clashes among their policies.
author2 S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
author_facet S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Pitakdumrongkit, Kaewkamol
format Article
author Pitakdumrongkit, Kaewkamol
author_sort Pitakdumrongkit, Kaewkamol
title The U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy and its implications for U.S.-ASEAN economic governance architecture
title_short The U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy and its implications for U.S.-ASEAN economic governance architecture
title_full The U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy and its implications for U.S.-ASEAN economic governance architecture
title_fullStr The U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy and its implications for U.S.-ASEAN economic governance architecture
title_full_unstemmed The U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy and its implications for U.S.-ASEAN economic governance architecture
title_sort u.s. indo-pacific strategy and its implications for u.s.-asean economic governance architecture
publishDate 2021
url https://keia.org/contributor/kaewkamol-pitakdumrongkit/
https://hdl.handle.net/10356/152666
_version_ 1759858402839756800
spelling sg-ntu-dr.10356-1526662023-03-05T17:24:16Z The U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy and its implications for U.S.-ASEAN economic governance architecture Pitakdumrongkit, Kaewkamol S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Social sciences::Political science Indo-Pacific Strategy Economic During his visit to Asia in November 2017, President Donald Trump announced his vision of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” as the U.S. approach to the region. The Department of State unveiled in detail the economic elements of the Indo-Pacific strategy in April 2018. These economic policies were reiterated by Vice President Mike Pence at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) CEO Summit in Papua New Guinea in November 2018. For instance, Pence maintained that Washington plans to “make bilateral trade agreements with any Indo-Pacific nation that wants to be our partner and that will abide by the principles of fair and reciprocal trade,” promote private sector investment, and assist regional states on sustainable infrastructure development. On December 31, Trump signed into law the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act (ARIA) passed by the U.S. Congress earlier that month. ARIA further advances the strategy by mandating the executive branch to “develop a long-term strategic vision and a comprehensive, multifaceted, and principled United States policy for the Indo-Pacific region.” Moreover, the text authorizes $1.5 billion to “the Department of State, United States Agency for International Development [USAID], and, as appropriate, the Department of Defense . . . for each of the fiscal years 2019 through 2023, which shall be used” to achieve several objectives including ensuring “the regulatory environments for trade, infrastructure, and investment in partner countries are transparent, open, and free of corruption.” Against this backdrop, this chapter examines the effects of the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy on the future of U.S.-ASEAN economic governance architecture. “Strategy” refers to “the collection of plans and policies that comprise the state’s deliberate effort to harness political, military, diplomatic, and economic tools together to advance that state’s national interest.” Such a study is warranted for a few reasons. First, the jury is still out on the degree to which this strategy would align or clash with different approaches and policies supported by Southeast Asian governments. Clashes of ideas and policies can result in not only failed implementation of the U.S. strategy but also competing economic initiatives which could undermine the future of U.S.-ASEAN trade and investment ties. Therefore, this research is aimed at: 1) assessing how the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy would interact with Southeast Asian nations’ policies to shape the future development of regional economic architectures, and 2) forging policy recommendations for the U.S. and ASEAN governments on how they could jointly pursue regional economic institution-building. The questions I explore include: 1) What are the economic components of the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy? 2) How will this strategy and Southeast Asian countries’ economic agendas/policies interact to shape the future advancement of regional economic architecture? and 3) What should American and ASEAN governments do to foster cooperation and lessen conflict among their different policies regarding economic regionalism? The chapter is organized as follows. The next part discusses the economic components of the Indo-Pacific strategy under the Trump administration. The second section examines the interactions between this strategy and the economic agendas of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to highlight the areas of complementarities and clashes. The last section provides policy recommendations for American and Southeast Asian governments to augment synergies and ameliorate clashes among their policies. Published version 2021-09-09T00:36:18Z 2021-09-09T00:36:18Z 2019 Journal Article Pitakdumrongkit, K. (2019). The U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy and its implications for U.S.-ASEAN economic governance architecture. Joint U.S. Korea Academic Studies, 2019, 257-273. N/A https://keia.org/contributor/kaewkamol-pitakdumrongkit/ https://hdl.handle.net/10356/152666 2019 257 273 en Joint U.S. Korea Academic Studies © 2019 Korea Economic Institute (KEI). All rights reserved. This book chapter is made available with permission of Korea Economic Institute (KEI). application/pdf