The "Non-Naturalistic Fallacy" in Lao-Zhuang Daoism
The Lao-Zhuang Daoist account of values is grounded in a processual understanding of nature and experience.1 Building on previous scholarship, I take the Daoist as describing an anti-representational account of experience.2 The intent of the present study is to clarify how the Daoist understandin...
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
2021
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Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/10356/153626 |
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Institution: | Nanyang Technological University |
Language: | English |
Summary: | The Lao-Zhuang Daoist account of values is grounded in a processual
understanding of nature and experience.1 Building on previous scholarship, I
take the Daoist as describing an anti-representational account of experience.2 The intent of the present study is to clarify how the Daoist
understanding of mind and morality is radically naturalistic such that it
simultaneously critiques non-naturalistic accounts of values and morality as
the source of unnecessary suffering in the world. Drawing on the same spirit
as John Dewey’s critique of the Western philosophical tradition, I argue that
the Daoist understanding of nature would hold that any attempt to isolate
qualities from the contexts of which they are unique products would commit
an epistemological fallacy—what can be called the “Non-Naturalistic
Fallacy.” The Daoist tradition would claim that qualities are properties of
interrelationship and are always context dependent and novel. In other
words, no such quality or “thing” like a good/value/end-in-itself exists.
Furthermore, the Daoist account of nature would also claim that it is
actually “non-naturalistic” accounts of value that are the root sources of
unnecessary suffering in human society. “Intrinsic value,” far from being an
assumption necessary for grounding ethical conduct, provides a formula for
coercive and oppressive behavior. I conclude by illustrating how this is the
case. Although there is more that can be done to help illustrate why and
how “intrinsic value” is naturally an oppressive idea,3 I focus on how the
notion helps to justify “any means necessary” conduct such as war. War can
only be considered to be of positive moral value if the existence of “intrinsic
value” is assumed. For the Daoist, war is never a possible means to a
morally good end. |
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