Assignment under task dependent private information
An agent's private information on his investment return is payoff-relevant only upon investment. This paper studies the contracting and assignment problem of a principal who can assign her agent to invest, which improves the agent's future productivity but allows the agent to exploit his p...
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| 格式: | Article |
| 語言: | English |
| 出版: |
2022
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| 主題: | |
| 在線閱讀: | https://hdl.handle.net/10356/159918 |
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| 機構: | Nanyang Technological University |
| 語言: | English |