Voluntary disclosure with evolving news
We study a dynamic voluntary disclosure setting where the manager's information and the firm's value evolve over time. The manager is not limited in her disclosure opportunities, but disclosure is costly. The results show that the manager discloses even if this leads to a price decrease in...
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Main Authors: | Aghamolla, Cyrus, An, Byeong-Je |
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Other Authors: | Nanyang Business School |
Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
2022
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/10356/161437 |
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Institution: | Nanyang Technological University |
Language: | English |
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