A game theoretic approach of optimal adoption time of blockchain: a case of ship operators

With increasing uncertainties in the global economy, companies are facing fierce competition. Blockchain has the potential to enhance companies’ competitiveness by streamlining processes, improving productivity and reducing costs. It is meaningful to study whether and when companies would adopt bloc...

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Main Authors: Pu, Shuyi, Lam, Jasmine Siu Lee
Other Authors: School of Civil and Environmental Engineering
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: 2022
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Online Access:https://hdl.handle.net/10356/161955
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Institution: Nanyang Technological University
Language: English
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spelling sg-ntu-dr.10356-1619552022-09-27T06:03:09Z A game theoretic approach of optimal adoption time of blockchain: a case of ship operators Pu, Shuyi Lam, Jasmine Siu Lee School of Civil and Environmental Engineering Engineering::Maritime studies Blockchain Adoption Time With increasing uncertainties in the global economy, companies are facing fierce competition. Blockchain has the potential to enhance companies’ competitiveness by streamlining processes, improving productivity and reducing costs. It is meaningful to study whether and when companies would adopt blockchain and under what conditions. We develop a game theoretic model to analyse the introduction of blockchain to companies from a big customer with bargaining power. In this study, ship operators need to decide their optimal adoption time when facing a request from a big shipper to adopt blockchain with a threat of substitution policy from the shipper. An algorithm is developed to obtain the numerical solutions of ship operators’ optimal adoption time. Our analysis suggests that 1) the substitution policy only matters to small companies and is only necessary under fixed pricing model; 2) a threshold applies for substitution ratio and cut-off time to effectively induce small companies to adopt blockchain early; 3) blockchain developers should consider mixed pricing model instead of fixed pricing model for faster and wider blockchain adoption; 4) blockchain initiators should focus more on improving the technology's cost-effectiveness rather than rely heavily on externalities like substitution policies to promote blockchain adoption. 2022-09-27T06:03:09Z 2022-09-27T06:03:09Z 2022 Journal Article Pu, S. & Lam, J. S. L. (2022). A game theoretic approach of optimal adoption time of blockchain: a case of ship operators. Computers and Industrial Engineering, 169, 108219-. https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cie.2022.108219 0360-8352 https://hdl.handle.net/10356/161955 10.1016/j.cie.2022.108219 2-s2.0-85130705182 169 108219 en Computers and Industrial Engineering © 2022 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
institution Nanyang Technological University
building NTU Library
continent Asia
country Singapore
Singapore
content_provider NTU Library
collection DR-NTU
language English
topic Engineering::Maritime studies
Blockchain
Adoption Time
spellingShingle Engineering::Maritime studies
Blockchain
Adoption Time
Pu, Shuyi
Lam, Jasmine Siu Lee
A game theoretic approach of optimal adoption time of blockchain: a case of ship operators
description With increasing uncertainties in the global economy, companies are facing fierce competition. Blockchain has the potential to enhance companies’ competitiveness by streamlining processes, improving productivity and reducing costs. It is meaningful to study whether and when companies would adopt blockchain and under what conditions. We develop a game theoretic model to analyse the introduction of blockchain to companies from a big customer with bargaining power. In this study, ship operators need to decide their optimal adoption time when facing a request from a big shipper to adopt blockchain with a threat of substitution policy from the shipper. An algorithm is developed to obtain the numerical solutions of ship operators’ optimal adoption time. Our analysis suggests that 1) the substitution policy only matters to small companies and is only necessary under fixed pricing model; 2) a threshold applies for substitution ratio and cut-off time to effectively induce small companies to adopt blockchain early; 3) blockchain developers should consider mixed pricing model instead of fixed pricing model for faster and wider blockchain adoption; 4) blockchain initiators should focus more on improving the technology's cost-effectiveness rather than rely heavily on externalities like substitution policies to promote blockchain adoption.
author2 School of Civil and Environmental Engineering
author_facet School of Civil and Environmental Engineering
Pu, Shuyi
Lam, Jasmine Siu Lee
format Article
author Pu, Shuyi
Lam, Jasmine Siu Lee
author_sort Pu, Shuyi
title A game theoretic approach of optimal adoption time of blockchain: a case of ship operators
title_short A game theoretic approach of optimal adoption time of blockchain: a case of ship operators
title_full A game theoretic approach of optimal adoption time of blockchain: a case of ship operators
title_fullStr A game theoretic approach of optimal adoption time of blockchain: a case of ship operators
title_full_unstemmed A game theoretic approach of optimal adoption time of blockchain: a case of ship operators
title_sort game theoretic approach of optimal adoption time of blockchain: a case of ship operators
publishDate 2022
url https://hdl.handle.net/10356/161955
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