Interests, ideologies, and great power spheres of influence

Militarily aggressive actions by Russia and China in recent years have sparked a debate among foreign policy commentators regarding the utility of spheres of influence, even as International Relations (IR) scholars have continued to neglect the phenomenon. This article tests three rival theories tha...

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Main Author: Resnick, Evan N.
Other Authors: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: 2022
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Online Access:https://hdl.handle.net/10356/162144
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Institution: Nanyang Technological University
Language: English
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spelling sg-ntu-dr.10356-1621442022-10-05T07:19:31Z Interests, ideologies, and great power spheres of influence Resnick, Evan N. S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Social sciences::Political science::International relations Spheres of Influence Structural Realism Militarily aggressive actions by Russia and China in recent years have sparked a debate among foreign policy commentators regarding the utility of spheres of influence, even as International Relations (IR) scholars have continued to neglect the phenomenon. This article tests three rival theories that attempt to explain the spheres of influence behavior of great powers. Structural realism proposes that a great power will cede a small power to the sphere of a rival that possesses a stronger material interest in the small power and is a peer competitor, and that a consequent rupture or crisis in the sphere will lead the great power to engage in vigorous but restricted cooperation with the restive small power that maintains the previously granted sphere. Ideological distance theory (IDT) hypothesizes that a great power will steadfastly oppose ceding an ideologically homogeneous small power to the sphere of an ideologically divergent peer competitor, and that a rupture in a previously granted sphere will result in noncooperation between the great power grantor and restive small power if they are ideologically heterogeneous. I introduce a third approach, modified ideological distance theory (MIDT), which predicts that a great power will temporarily oppose ceding an ideologically homogeneous small power to the sphere of an ideologically divergent peer competitor, and will engage in delayed and attenuated cooperation with an ideologically heterogeneous small power following a rupture in a peer competitor’s sphere. Examination of the United States’ relationship with Yugoslavia (1948–1955) and the Soviet Union’s relationship with Cuba (1960–1962) demonstrates MIDT’s explanatory superiority. 2022-10-05T07:19:31Z 2022-10-05T07:19:31Z 2022 Journal Article Resnick, E. N. (2022). Interests, ideologies, and great power spheres of influence. European Journal of International Relations, 28(3), 563-588. https://dx.doi.org/10.1177/13540661221098217 1354-0661 https://hdl.handle.net/10356/162144 10.1177/13540661221098217 2-s2.0-85131396565 3 28 563 588 en European Journal of International Relations © 2022 The Author(s). All rights reserved.
institution Nanyang Technological University
building NTU Library
continent Asia
country Singapore
Singapore
content_provider NTU Library
collection DR-NTU
language English
topic Social sciences::Political science::International relations
Spheres of Influence
Structural Realism
spellingShingle Social sciences::Political science::International relations
Spheres of Influence
Structural Realism
Resnick, Evan N.
Interests, ideologies, and great power spheres of influence
description Militarily aggressive actions by Russia and China in recent years have sparked a debate among foreign policy commentators regarding the utility of spheres of influence, even as International Relations (IR) scholars have continued to neglect the phenomenon. This article tests three rival theories that attempt to explain the spheres of influence behavior of great powers. Structural realism proposes that a great power will cede a small power to the sphere of a rival that possesses a stronger material interest in the small power and is a peer competitor, and that a consequent rupture or crisis in the sphere will lead the great power to engage in vigorous but restricted cooperation with the restive small power that maintains the previously granted sphere. Ideological distance theory (IDT) hypothesizes that a great power will steadfastly oppose ceding an ideologically homogeneous small power to the sphere of an ideologically divergent peer competitor, and that a rupture in a previously granted sphere will result in noncooperation between the great power grantor and restive small power if they are ideologically heterogeneous. I introduce a third approach, modified ideological distance theory (MIDT), which predicts that a great power will temporarily oppose ceding an ideologically homogeneous small power to the sphere of an ideologically divergent peer competitor, and will engage in delayed and attenuated cooperation with an ideologically heterogeneous small power following a rupture in a peer competitor’s sphere. Examination of the United States’ relationship with Yugoslavia (1948–1955) and the Soviet Union’s relationship with Cuba (1960–1962) demonstrates MIDT’s explanatory superiority.
author2 S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
author_facet S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Resnick, Evan N.
format Article
author Resnick, Evan N.
author_sort Resnick, Evan N.
title Interests, ideologies, and great power spheres of influence
title_short Interests, ideologies, and great power spheres of influence
title_full Interests, ideologies, and great power spheres of influence
title_fullStr Interests, ideologies, and great power spheres of influence
title_full_unstemmed Interests, ideologies, and great power spheres of influence
title_sort interests, ideologies, and great power spheres of influence
publishDate 2022
url https://hdl.handle.net/10356/162144
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