Effects of uniform-allocation constraints in networked common-pool resource extraction games
Communities that share common-pool resources (CPRs) often coordinate their actions to sustain resource quality more effectively than if they were regulated by some centralized authority. Networked models of CPR extraction suggest that the flexibility of individual agents to selectively allocate extr...
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Main Authors: | Schauf, Andrew, Oh, Poong |
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Other Authors: | Wee Kim Wee School of Communication and Information |
Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
2022
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/10356/162565 |
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Institution: | Nanyang Technological University |
Language: | English |
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