Accommodating the plural nature of disadvantage in Rawls' framework of justice as fairness

• Main Author: Tan, Stefanie Kai Ying
• Other Authors: Lim Chong Ming
• Format: Final Year Project
• Language: English
• Published: Nanyang Technological University 2023
• Subjects: Humanities::Philosophy
• Online Access: https://hdl.handle.net/10356/165454
• Institution: Nanyang Technological University

The paper’s main aim is to show that a plural nature of disadvantage can be fitted into John Rawls’ framework of justice as fairness. This is an interesting consideration because Rawls has been criticized for leaving out certain real-world disadvantages from the purview of justice as fairness. If a fit can be made, then the thesis will demonstrate how Rawls’ framework is designed to address all sorts of disadvantages that exist. A comb through Rawls’ A Theory of Justice (Revised Edition) is sufficient for the paper to construct this framework because this book contains the fundamental tenets for Rawlsian justice. As for the plural nature of disadvantage, the paper adopts the views posited by Avner Deshalit and Jonathan Wolff in Disadvantage. My main claim is that Rawls’ framework can accommodate the plural nature of disadvantage under non-ideal theory. More specifically, I fit this understanding of disadvantage into the general facts provision within the original position. Primarily, this paper will focus on justifying why this fit can be made, and demonstrating how it plays out in Rawls’ framework.