Patterns of "reason": Spinoza and the Cheng brothers on understanding the one and the many

Since the Jesuits brought to Europe the first Latin translations of Chinese Confucian texts in the 17th century, scholars have attempted to interpret foreign ideas through the lenses of familiar ones by associating the Neo-Confucian tradition to the thought of the Dutch philosopher Baruch Spinoza. I...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Simionato, Alice
Other Authors: Dimitris Apostolopoulos
Format: Thesis-Doctor of Philosophy
Language:English
Published: Nanyang Technological University 2023
Subjects:
Online Access:https://hdl.handle.net/10356/166786
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Institution: Nanyang Technological University
Language: English
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Summary:Since the Jesuits brought to Europe the first Latin translations of Chinese Confucian texts in the 17th century, scholars have attempted to interpret foreign ideas through the lenses of familiar ones by associating the Neo-Confucian tradition to the thought of the Dutch philosopher Baruch Spinoza. In particular, the association has been variously made on the basis of a supposedly shared ‘monistic rationalism’, a categorization that has long remained unquestioned. Moving away from the religious and political agendas upon which this cross-cultural link has been initially elaborated, this research examines the philosophical value of this case study by enacting a comparison between Spinoza and the Neo-Confucian Cheng brothers, Cheng Hao 程顥and Cheng Yi 程頤. On the basis of specific methodological assumptions – which have been conceived in order to ensure conceptual clarity and differentiation in consideration of such distant cultural, historical, and linguistic contexts - I argue that an attentive examination of Spinoza and the Cheng’s thought can provide a unified understanding of the characteristics and functioning of ‘reason’ in its epistemological and ethical value. By examining the metaphysical commitments of these philosophers, which ascribe to two kinds of oneness (Natura and Dao), I then discuss the epistemological and ethical consequences deriving from both frameworks. In light of the comparison enacted, I argue that Spinoza’s ratio and the Cheng’s li 理 of the mind (xin 心) and nature (xing 性) provide a coextensive notion of ‘reason’. The latter emerges as a modus operandi which is embedded and embodied, and that I interpret as a practice of self-extension by means of which the individual understands oneness through its differentiations. By articulating such an understanding of ‘reason’, the research also problematizes the ‘rationalist’ label that has been retrospectively attached to both Spinoza and the Cheng brothers, which may have hindered the full appreciation of this cross-cultural link’s philosophical value.