Side channel power analysis on a target with an AES-256 encryption

Side-channel attacks (SCA) are attacks launched by cyber attackers to uncover information from cryptography devices. This information may include confidential plaintexts or secret keys used for encryption, and hence highlights the need for further studies in protecting ourselves against such a...

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Main Author: Yeow, Jun Wei
Other Authors: Gwee Bah Hwee
Format: Final Year Project
Language:English
Published: Nanyang Technological University 2023
Subjects:
Online Access:https://hdl.handle.net/10356/167657
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Institution: Nanyang Technological University
Language: English
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spelling sg-ntu-dr.10356-1676572023-07-07T16:27:09Z Side channel power analysis on a target with an AES-256 encryption Yeow, Jun Wei Gwee Bah Hwee School of Electrical and Electronic Engineering ebhgwee@ntu.edu.sg Engineering::Electrical and electronic engineering::Wireless communication systems Side-channel attacks (SCA) are attacks launched by cyber attackers to uncover information from cryptography devices. This information may include confidential plaintexts or secret keys used for encryption, and hence highlights the need for further studies in protecting ourselves against such attacks. In this report, we will discuss how Power Analysis Attacks may be used by attackers to uncover our confidential information. Two main forms of analysis attacks will be discussed – namely correlation and differential power attacks. The focus of the report will be on how these power attacks work and will discuss the results of our experiments on implementing these forms of attacks on devices under Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). Bachelor of Engineering (Electrical and Electronic Engineering) 2023-05-30T08:57:27Z 2023-05-30T08:57:27Z 2023 Final Year Project (FYP) Yeow, J. W. (2023). Side channel power analysis on a target with an AES-256 encryption. Final Year Project (FYP), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. https://hdl.handle.net/10356/167657 https://hdl.handle.net/10356/167657 en A2131 - 221 application/pdf Nanyang Technological University
institution Nanyang Technological University
building NTU Library
continent Asia
country Singapore
Singapore
content_provider NTU Library
collection DR-NTU
language English
topic Engineering::Electrical and electronic engineering::Wireless communication systems
spellingShingle Engineering::Electrical and electronic engineering::Wireless communication systems
Yeow, Jun Wei
Side channel power analysis on a target with an AES-256 encryption
description Side-channel attacks (SCA) are attacks launched by cyber attackers to uncover information from cryptography devices. This information may include confidential plaintexts or secret keys used for encryption, and hence highlights the need for further studies in protecting ourselves against such attacks. In this report, we will discuss how Power Analysis Attacks may be used by attackers to uncover our confidential information. Two main forms of analysis attacks will be discussed – namely correlation and differential power attacks. The focus of the report will be on how these power attacks work and will discuss the results of our experiments on implementing these forms of attacks on devices under Advanced Encryption Standard (AES).
author2 Gwee Bah Hwee
author_facet Gwee Bah Hwee
Yeow, Jun Wei
format Final Year Project
author Yeow, Jun Wei
author_sort Yeow, Jun Wei
title Side channel power analysis on a target with an AES-256 encryption
title_short Side channel power analysis on a target with an AES-256 encryption
title_full Side channel power analysis on a target with an AES-256 encryption
title_fullStr Side channel power analysis on a target with an AES-256 encryption
title_full_unstemmed Side channel power analysis on a target with an AES-256 encryption
title_sort side channel power analysis on a target with an aes-256 encryption
publisher Nanyang Technological University
publishDate 2023
url https://hdl.handle.net/10356/167657
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