Distributed resilient secondary control strategy for DC microgrids under cyber-attacks

DC microgrid has attracted a lot of attention in recent years due to its ability to integrate various renewable energy sources. However, since DC microgrids usually rely on communication between each distributed generator (DGs) in implementation, it is vulnerable to cyber-attacks, such as DoS a...

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Main Author: Jiang, Xuan
Other Authors: Wen Changyun
Format: Thesis-Master by Coursework
Language:English
Published: Nanyang Technological University 2023
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Online Access:https://hdl.handle.net/10356/168323
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Institution: Nanyang Technological University
Language: English
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spelling sg-ntu-dr.10356-1683232023-07-04T15:15:06Z Distributed resilient secondary control strategy for DC microgrids under cyber-attacks Jiang, Xuan Wen Changyun School of Electrical and Electronic Engineering ECYWEN@ntu.edu.sg Engineering::Electrical and electronic engineering DC microgrid has attracted a lot of attention in recent years due to its ability to integrate various renewable energy sources. However, since DC microgrids usually rely on communication between each distributed generator (DGs) in implementation, it is vulnerable to cyber-attacks, such as DoS and FDI. In this dissertation, a distributed resilient control algorithm that enables DC microgrids to cope with both DoS and FDI attacks is put forward. Initially, the advantages of multiple-bus DC microgrids are compared with AC microgrids, and single-bus microgrids are analyzed. Next, the hierarchical control architectures of microgrids are discussed. After this, a physical model of islanded DC microgrids in the case of no attack is constructed. Subsequently, a DoS attack model is constructed with assumptions about attack duration and frequency. A distributed resilient control algorithm, which can be applied to each distributed generator separately, is designed to resist DoS attacks on the communication links between DGs. Then FDI attacks are modeled with the amplitude-bounded unknown function caused by the attacks. To compensate for the effects of FDI on DC MGs, an intermediate observer is included in the distributed controller. Afterward, the second method of Lyapunov is used to prove that the DC MGs under DoS and FDI attacks with the proposed control method can realize power sharing and global voltage restoration. Then appropriate controller parameters are selected through rigorous theoretical analysis. Finally, case studies based on Simulink show that the control strategy can make DC MGs resist DoS attacks and FDI attacks simultaneously. Master of Science (Computer Control and Automation) 2023-05-29T04:29:52Z 2023-05-29T04:29:52Z 2023 Thesis-Master by Coursework Jiang, X. (2023). Distributed resilient secondary control strategy for DC microgrids under cyber-attacks. Master's thesis, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. https://hdl.handle.net/10356/168323 https://hdl.handle.net/10356/168323 en D-255-22231-05683 application/pdf Nanyang Technological University
institution Nanyang Technological University
building NTU Library
continent Asia
country Singapore
Singapore
content_provider NTU Library
collection DR-NTU
language English
topic Engineering::Electrical and electronic engineering
spellingShingle Engineering::Electrical and electronic engineering
Jiang, Xuan
Distributed resilient secondary control strategy for DC microgrids under cyber-attacks
description DC microgrid has attracted a lot of attention in recent years due to its ability to integrate various renewable energy sources. However, since DC microgrids usually rely on communication between each distributed generator (DGs) in implementation, it is vulnerable to cyber-attacks, such as DoS and FDI. In this dissertation, a distributed resilient control algorithm that enables DC microgrids to cope with both DoS and FDI attacks is put forward. Initially, the advantages of multiple-bus DC microgrids are compared with AC microgrids, and single-bus microgrids are analyzed. Next, the hierarchical control architectures of microgrids are discussed. After this, a physical model of islanded DC microgrids in the case of no attack is constructed. Subsequently, a DoS attack model is constructed with assumptions about attack duration and frequency. A distributed resilient control algorithm, which can be applied to each distributed generator separately, is designed to resist DoS attacks on the communication links between DGs. Then FDI attacks are modeled with the amplitude-bounded unknown function caused by the attacks. To compensate for the effects of FDI on DC MGs, an intermediate observer is included in the distributed controller. Afterward, the second method of Lyapunov is used to prove that the DC MGs under DoS and FDI attacks with the proposed control method can realize power sharing and global voltage restoration. Then appropriate controller parameters are selected through rigorous theoretical analysis. Finally, case studies based on Simulink show that the control strategy can make DC MGs resist DoS attacks and FDI attacks simultaneously.
author2 Wen Changyun
author_facet Wen Changyun
Jiang, Xuan
format Thesis-Master by Coursework
author Jiang, Xuan
author_sort Jiang, Xuan
title Distributed resilient secondary control strategy for DC microgrids under cyber-attacks
title_short Distributed resilient secondary control strategy for DC microgrids under cyber-attacks
title_full Distributed resilient secondary control strategy for DC microgrids under cyber-attacks
title_fullStr Distributed resilient secondary control strategy for DC microgrids under cyber-attacks
title_full_unstemmed Distributed resilient secondary control strategy for DC microgrids under cyber-attacks
title_sort distributed resilient secondary control strategy for dc microgrids under cyber-attacks
publisher Nanyang Technological University
publishDate 2023
url https://hdl.handle.net/10356/168323
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