A game-based incentive-driven offloading framework for dispersed computing

• Main Authors: Wu, Hongjia, Nie, Jiangtian, Xiong, Zehui, Cai, Zhiping, Zhou, Tongqing, Yuen, Chau, Niyato, Dusit
• Other Authors: School of Computer Science and Engineering
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Published: 2023
• Subjects: Engineering::Computer science and engineering; Mobile Computing; Task Offloading
• Online Access: https://hdl.handle.net/10356/172082
• Institution: Nanyang Technological University

The popularization of smart Internet of Things (IoT) devices has facilitated the development of fog/edge computing. However, these infrastructure-based service paradigms may fail to complete tasks successfully due to computation and communication overload, or damage in challenging scenarios such as disasters or traffic jams. Noticing that a crowd of devices with considerable idle resources could be available, we investigate the problems of addressing the computation and communication unavailability with peer assistance in this work. To this end, we propose a dispersed service framework for resource-exhausted scenarios that adaptively offloads users' data to available network computation points. However, the users may not be able to achieve the offloading due to geographical hindrances. Consequently, the relay is introduced as a bridge for data offloading between the users and the network computation points. Furthermore, a game-based incentive-driven offloading mechanism is designed by analyzing and balancing the cost and gain factors of three main entities (users, relays, and network computation points). Considering the interactions among the entities, a two-level Stackelberg game is established for efficiently allocating potential computation resource, as well as balancing the utility conflicts due to the data offloading. Given the hierarchical interaction structure, the upper level game involves network computation points as followers and the relay as a leader, while the lower level game includes the relay as a follower and users as leaders. Moreover, to facilitate applicability in large-scale scenarios with multiple relays, we decompose multiple relays into multiple single relay problems using a tripartite matching strategy that assigns appropriate relays to users and network computation points. The simulation results demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed game-based incentive-driven mechanism and show that it outperforms the baselines in terms of the overall utilities of the involved entities and the average energy consumption of users.