Optimal multi-unit allocation with costly verification

A principal has n homogeneous objects to allocate to I> n agents. The principal can allocate at most one good to an agent, and each agent values the good. Agents have private information about the principal’s payoff of allocating the goods. There are no monetary transfers, but the principal may c...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Chua, Geoffrey A., Hu, Gaoji, Liu, Fang
Other Authors: Nanyang Business School
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: 2023
Subjects:
Online Access:https://hdl.handle.net/10356/172252
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
Institution: Nanyang Technological University
Language: English
Be the first to leave a comment!
You must be logged in first