Optimal multi-unit allocation with costly verification
A principal has n homogeneous objects to allocate to I> n agents. The principal can allocate at most one good to an agent, and each agent values the good. Agents have private information about the principal’s payoff of allocating the goods. There are no monetary transfers, but the principal may c...
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格式: | Article |
語言: | English |
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2023
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在線閱讀: | https://hdl.handle.net/10356/172252 |
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機構: | Nanyang Technological University |
語言: | English |
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