Mutual funds' capital gains lock-in and earnings management
Capital gains taxation creates a lock-in effect, increasing investors' incentives to monitor and decreasing portfolio firms' incentives to cater to short-term investors. We show a negative relation between lock-in and portfolio firms' earnings management, and this relation is stronger...
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| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Other Authors: | |
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
2024
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/10356/172930 |
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| Institution: | Nanyang Technological University |
| Language: | English |
| Summary: | Capital gains taxation creates a lock-in effect, increasing investors' incentives to monitor and decreasing portfolio firms' incentives to cater to short-term investors. We show a negative relation between lock-in and portfolio firms' earnings management, and this relation is stronger for capital gains held by tax-sensitive investors. Further, the relation between lock-in and earnings management is stronger when the capital gains tax rate is higher. We show that locked-in funds vote against management and against audit committee members' reappointment following earnings management. Locked-in funds are less likely to exit a position following disappointing earnings announcements, reducing firms' incentive to manage earnings. |
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