Knowledge processes in special operations : the case of operations Jaywick and Rimau.
For any Special Operation mission to be successful, a great deal of intelligence must be acquired in order to find out the weakest points of the enemy and come up with a careful plan that exploits these. McRaven (1995) proposed a success framework for special operations missions to be successful,...
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Format: | Theses and Dissertations |
Language: | English |
Published: |
2010
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Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/10356/41848 |
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Institution: | Nanyang Technological University |
Language: | English |
Summary: | For any Special Operation mission to be successful, a great deal of intelligence must
be acquired in order to find out the weakest points of the enemy and come up with a
careful plan that exploits these. McRaven (1995) proposed a success framework for
special operations missions to be successful, and this consists of six factors Simplicity, Security, Repetition, Surprise, Speed and Purpose. This paper taps on the above success framework in order to come up with a framework for Knowledge Processes in Special Operations. Two case studies were
then compared and contrasted based on this framework. Operations Jaywick and Rimau were special operations missions conducted by the Australian Services Reconnaissance Department during World War II, with the aim of destroying enemy shipping in Japanese-held Singapore. This paper also looks as to why the former was successful, while the latter ended with all its members either killed or executed by the Japanese. It has been found that three factors mainly caused the failure of Operation Rimau - inadequate intelligence acquired during planning, inability to rehearse all key activities during training, and lack of communication between teams due to prioritisation of security. It was also found that Operation Jaywick had these symptoms, and that its success was attributed to luck and the relative unprepared-ness of the enemy. |
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