Explaining islamist insurgencies : the case of Al Jamaah Al Islamiyyah and the radicalisation of the Poso conflict, 2000-2007.
Why do some people turn to terrorism while others from the same background and the same set of experiences do not? This is the question the study sets out to answer through examining the process of radicalisation in an Islamist insurgency. It uses the conflict in Poso, in the Indonesian province of...
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Format: | Theses and Dissertations |
Language: | English |
Published: |
2013
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Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/10356/52461 |
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Institution: | Nanyang Technological University |
Language: | English |
Summary: | Why do some people turn to terrorism while others from the same background and the same set of experiences do not? This is the question the study sets out to answer through examining the process of radicalisation in an Islamist insurgency. It uses the conflict in Poso, in the Indonesian province of Central Sulawesi, from 1998 to 2007 as a case study, with a particular focus on the role of the organisation Al Jamaah Al Islamiyyah (JI) there after 2000. The study builds on the framework suggested in Louise Richardson’s study, What Terrorists Want – that for terrorism to occur, there must be a disaffected set of individuals, an enabling group and a legitimising ideology – and communications theory to develop a new model of Islamist radicalisation. It suggests that for the legitimising ideology, in this case Salafi Jihadism, to be effectively disseminated, there must be a attractive or charismatic sender; a susceptible receiver; a powerful message; and internal and external contexts that support the transmittal. Poso was chosen as the case study because all stages of the radicalisation process are clear, and both information and individuals are highly accessible. The study establishes that JI can be considered an Islamist insurgency, not just a terrorist organisation. This is not only because of its historical ties to the rebellions against the Indonesian state in the 1950s but also because of its ideological antipathy to what it views as the thaghut or tyrannical post-Soeharto governments because of their failure to establish Islamic law. The history of JI, based in primary documents and interviews, is used to illustrate this point. It then gives a brief description of the Poso conflict and how several radical organisations from outside the area became involved in it. One of these was JI, whose local recruits were called Mujahidin Tanah Runtuh (MTR) after the neighbourhood where they lived. Another was Mujahidin Kompak Kayamanya (MKK) a spin-off from KOMPAK, an Islamic charity that became affiliated with a group in the Kayamanya area of Poso. |
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