Incentive compatible design of reverse auctions.

• Main Author: Gravin, Nikolai.
• Other Authors: School of Physical and Mathematical Sciences
• Format: Research Report
• Language: English
• Published: 2013
• Subjects: DRNTU::Science::Mathematics::Discrete mathematics::Theory of computation; DRNTU::Science::Mathematics::Applied mathematics::Game theory; DRNTU::Science::Mathematics::Discrete mathematics::Graph theory; DRNTU::Science::Mathematics::Applied mathematics::Optimization
• Online Access: http://hdl.handle.net/10356/54944
• Institution: Nanyang Technological University

We consider two classes of optimization problems that emerge in the set up of the reverse auctions (a.k.a. procurement auctions). Unlike the standard optimization taking place for a commonly known input, we assume that every individual submits his piece of the input and may misreport his data or not...