The U.S. decision-making in the third Taiwan strait crisis.

• Main Author: Ye, Wei.
• Other Authors: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
• Format: Theses and Dissertations
• Language: English
• Published: 2013
• Subjects: DRNTU::Humanities
• Online Access: http://hdl.handle.net/10356/55178
• Institution: Nanyang Technological University

The Third Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1995-1996 is the first major crisis between the U.S. and China after the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two states in 1979. Two significant decisions, granting Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui a visa to visit the United States in 1995 and deploying two aircraft carrier battle groups near Taiwan Strait in 1996, were made by the U.S. during the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis. This thesis differs from previous studies by applying Graham T. Allison's conceptual models of foreign policy behavior to explore which model works best in explaining the U.S. decision-making in the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis. The study showed that in the pre-crisis stage, none of Allison's conceptual models worked well in explaining the decision to grant Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui's visa and that the Organizational Process Model had better explanatory power in explaining the crisis decision to deploy two aircraft carrier battle groups near Taiwan Strait. The decision to grant Lee's visa was a compromise from the executive branch to Congress. In contrast, the decision to deploy two aircraft carrier battle groups near Taiwan Strait could be best explained by the organizational process of the Department of Defense. It also indicated that a common feature of Allison's three models was the emphasis on the executive branch. Congressional influences, as well as partisanship, and public opinion involved in and out of Congress, were largely ignored by Allison's models. Although the Bureaucratic Politics Model paid some attention to the congressional influences, partisanship, and public opinions, these factors were considered less important when compared to the power of governmental leaders. Finally, this thesis generated two implications for China to better manage Sino-U.S. crisis by having a deeper understanding of U.S. foreign policy decision-making. Predictions about the U.S. foreign policy toward China should not be made simply according to the calculation of specific organizations related to the event. The role of the U.S. congress in foreign policy should not be ignored.