Bystander or intervener: what determines U.S. decision on humanitarian intervention?

• Main Author: Wang, Zhaoyu
• Other Authors: Evan Resnick
• Format: Theses and Dissertations
• Language: English
• Published: 2015
• Subjects: DRNTU::Business::International business::Policy
• Online Access: http://hdl.handle.net/10356/64808
• Institution: Nanyang Technological University

Humanitarian intervention has always been an interesting but controversial phenomenon in international relations and the debate around this issue prevails. Different theories have provided different standards to interpret states' occasional commitment in humanitarian interventions. Moreover, by the end of Cold War, the international security environment has changed fundamentally along with the collapse of the bipolar system and the United States has asserted a new role in international affairs. In the Post-Cold War era, the U.S. had been involved in five different conflicts related to humanitarian issues: Somalia {1992-1993), Haiti {1994-1995), Bosnia {1995-2004), Kosovo {1999-present) and Libya {2011). However, while intervening to protect lives in Somalia and Libya, Washington ignored crises in Rwanda, Yemen and Syria. What determines the U.S.'s decision in humanitarian intervention? To answer this question, this paper will take a realist perspective, arguing that the US decision concerning humanitarian intervention is motivated by national interests. To discuss further, the article will discuss two key variables of national interests, namely military alliance and low cost military plan, and test their validity in constructing American humanitarian intervention decisions accordingly. Case studies of Libya and Syria will be illustrated to support my findings.