An economic model of shadow banking : double tranches and heterogeneous risk tolerance
Faced with the expansion of accumulated non-performing loans (NPLs), commercial banks widely adopt a financial process of “securitization” to reduce NPLs and transfer credit risks to the debt market. However, repercussions of the subprime mortgage crisis have prompted regulators to contemplate broad...
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sg-ntu-dr.10356-669142019-12-10T11:33:11Z An economic model of shadow banking : double tranches and heterogeneous risk tolerance Hu, Zehui Long, Zijie Yang, Yi Wu Guiying Laura School of Humanities and Social Sciences DRNTU::Social sciences::Economic theory::Macroeconomics Faced with the expansion of accumulated non-performing loans (NPLs), commercial banks widely adopt a financial process of “securitization” to reduce NPLs and transfer credit risks to the debt market. However, repercussions of the subprime mortgage crisis have prompted regulators to contemplate broader perspectives on securitization to mitigate risk and ensure systemic stability. The GSV model (2013) has studied equilibrium interest rates in a debt market with profit maximizing shadow banks and infinitely risk-averse investors, but yet to include structured debt with heterogeneous risk tolerance of institutional investors. Our paper incorporated these two features to provide a more rigorous competitive bidding model for determination of Nash equilibria under different scenarios. Through further sensitivity analysis, we obtained results with manifest implications for market structure reforms and regulatory capital requirements for shadow banking. With a double-tranche structure, intermediaries utilize wealth more effectively; total profits of investors and shadow banks, representing the overall efficiency of the market, also increase due to enhanced liquidity. When tail risk is neglected, tranching entices intermediaries into more aggressive leverage with heightened financial vulnerability to aggregate disturbance. Bachelor of Arts 2016-05-04T08:04:31Z 2016-05-04T08:04:31Z 2016 Final Year Project (FYP) http://hdl.handle.net/10356/66914 en Nanyang Technological University 105 p. application/pdf |
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DRNTU::Social sciences::Economic theory::Macroeconomics Hu, Zehui Long, Zijie Yang, Yi An economic model of shadow banking : double tranches and heterogeneous risk tolerance |
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Faced with the expansion of accumulated non-performing loans (NPLs), commercial banks widely adopt a financial process of “securitization” to reduce NPLs and transfer credit risks to the debt market. However, repercussions of the subprime mortgage crisis have prompted regulators to contemplate broader perspectives on securitization to mitigate risk and ensure systemic stability. The GSV model (2013) has studied equilibrium interest rates in a debt market with profit maximizing shadow banks and infinitely risk-averse investors, but yet to include structured debt with heterogeneous risk tolerance of institutional investors. Our paper incorporated these two features to provide a more rigorous competitive bidding model for determination of Nash equilibria under different scenarios. Through further sensitivity analysis, we obtained results with manifest implications for market structure reforms and regulatory capital requirements for shadow banking. With a double-tranche structure, intermediaries utilize wealth more effectively; total profits of investors and shadow banks, representing the overall efficiency of the market, also increase due to enhanced liquidity. When tail risk is neglected, tranching entices intermediaries into more aggressive leverage with heightened financial vulnerability to aggregate disturbance. |
author2 |
Wu Guiying Laura |
author_facet |
Wu Guiying Laura Hu, Zehui Long, Zijie Yang, Yi |
format |
Final Year Project |
author |
Hu, Zehui Long, Zijie Yang, Yi |
author_sort |
Hu, Zehui |
title |
An economic model of shadow banking : double tranches and heterogeneous risk tolerance |
title_short |
An economic model of shadow banking : double tranches and heterogeneous risk tolerance |
title_full |
An economic model of shadow banking : double tranches and heterogeneous risk tolerance |
title_fullStr |
An economic model of shadow banking : double tranches and heterogeneous risk tolerance |
title_full_unstemmed |
An economic model of shadow banking : double tranches and heterogeneous risk tolerance |
title_sort |
economic model of shadow banking : double tranches and heterogeneous risk tolerance |
publishDate |
2016 |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/10356/66914 |
_version_ |
1681034892978159616 |