The non-conceptual nature of perception and its epistemological strength : a unified theory of perception

• Main Author: Ng, Ling Xuan
• Other Authors: Christopher Louis Suhler
• Format: Final Year Project
• Language: English
• Published: 2018
• Subjects: DRNTU::Humanities::Philosophy
• Online Access: http://hdl.handle.net/10356/73525
• Institution: Nanyang Technological University

The core of this paper argues for a unified theory of perception that can account for both phenomenology and epistemology. This will be done by appealing to the contents of perception and its relationship with knowledge. This will be done with the framework of intentionalism theory of perception. This paper argues for the case that perception and its contents are inherently non-conceptual. This is motivated by the tension that perception of the fine-grained details of the world which overwhelms one’s range of the concepts despite thoughts and beliefs about that same world also feature extensive amounts of concepts. The first part of the argument ends with the case that perception is ultimately non-conceptual. This invites the questions of how non-conceptual perception can accurately result in conceptual beliefs and whether these two processes can retain fidelity. This is answered in the second portion of the argument. The strength of this unified theory of perception will be tested with objections in three parts by, namely clarifying the role of concepts, alluding to the fine-grained details of the world and reaffirming the value in seeing perceptual contents and belief contents apart. With these accomplished, a unified theory of perception can be potentially feasible.