Peer evaluation : incentivizing truthful reporting
Groups assignments are a common sight in today's education requirements. Such assignments are useful in testing students on not only their knowledge of certain topics, but also on how effective they can apply said knowledge in a team environment. However, it is also widely known that the "...
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sg-ntu-dr.10356-771412023-02-28T23:14:07Z Peer evaluation : incentivizing truthful reporting Ong, Zheng Yao Fedor Duzhin School of Physical and Mathematical Sciences Tan Teck Yong DRNTU::Science::Mathematics DRNTU::Social sciences::Economic theory::Microeconomics Groups assignments are a common sight in today's education requirements. Such assignments are useful in testing students on not only their knowledge of certain topics, but also on how effective they can apply said knowledge in a team environment. However, it is also widely known that the "free rider" problem has plagued students and assessors alike since the advent of group assignments. It is not uncommon to see unbalanced groups where a competent minority does most or all the work whereas the majority choose to simply watch on. There are also cases of disputes where members disagree on how much they contributed. The most utilised method of assessing scores in this context involves peer evaluation. In this paper, we investigate a few scoring mechanisms that can help us resolve the issues above and serve as a useful tool for frustrated educators and students when it comes to peer evaluation scores. Bachelor of Science in Mathematics and Economics 2019-05-13T13:31:29Z 2019-05-13T13:31:29Z 2019 Final Year Project (FYP) http://hdl.handle.net/10356/77141 en 48 p. application/pdf |
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DRNTU::Science::Mathematics DRNTU::Social sciences::Economic theory::Microeconomics Ong, Zheng Yao Peer evaluation : incentivizing truthful reporting |
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Groups assignments are a common sight in today's education requirements. Such assignments are
useful in testing students on not only their knowledge of certain topics, but also on how effective they can apply said knowledge in a team environment. However, it is also widely known that the "free rider" problem has plagued students and assessors alike since the advent of group assignments. It is not uncommon to see unbalanced groups where a competent minority does most or all the work whereas the majority choose to simply watch on. There are also cases of disputes where members disagree on how much they contributed. The most utilised method of assessing scores in this context involves peer evaluation. In this paper, we investigate a few scoring mechanisms that can help us resolve the issues above and serve as a useful tool for frustrated educators and students when it comes to peer evaluation scores. |
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Fedor Duzhin |
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Fedor Duzhin Ong, Zheng Yao |
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Final Year Project |
author |
Ong, Zheng Yao |
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Ong, Zheng Yao |
title |
Peer evaluation : incentivizing truthful reporting |
title_short |
Peer evaluation : incentivizing truthful reporting |
title_full |
Peer evaluation : incentivizing truthful reporting |
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Peer evaluation : incentivizing truthful reporting |
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Peer evaluation : incentivizing truthful reporting |
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peer evaluation : incentivizing truthful reporting |
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2019 |
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http://hdl.handle.net/10356/77141 |
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1759855059441549312 |