Against Time Bias

Most of us display a bias toward the near: we prefer pleasurable experiences to be in our near future and painful experiences to be in our distant future. We also display a bias toward the future: we prefer pleasurable experiences to be in our future and painful experiences to be in our past. While...

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Main Authors: Greene, Preston, Sullivan, Meghan
Other Authors: School of Humanities and Social Sciences
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: 2016
Subjects:
Online Access:https://hdl.handle.net/10356/79718
http://hdl.handle.net/10220/40397
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Institution: Nanyang Technological University
Language: English
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spelling sg-ntu-dr.10356-797182020-03-07T12:10:37Z Against Time Bias Greene, Preston Sullivan, Meghan School of Humanities and Social Sciences Philosophy Most of us display a bias toward the near: we prefer pleasurable experiences to be in our near future and painful experiences to be in our distant future. We also display a bias toward the future: we prefer pleasurable experiences to be in our future and painful experiences to be in our past. While philosophers have tended to think that near bias is a rational defect, almost no one finds future bias objectionable. In this essay, we argue that this hybrid position is untenable. We conclude that those who reject near bias should instead endorse complete temporal neutrality. Published version 2016-04-12T04:40:24Z 2019-12-06T13:32:41Z 2016-04-12T04:40:24Z 2019-12-06T13:32:41Z 2015 2015 Journal Article Greene, P., & Sullivan, M. (2015). Against Time Bias. Ethics, 125(4), 947-970. 0014-1704 https://hdl.handle.net/10356/79718 http://hdl.handle.net/10220/40397 10.1086/680910 184769 en Ethics © 2015 The University of Chicago. This paper was published in Ethics and is made available as an electronic reprint (preprint) with permission of The University of Chicago. The published version is available at: [http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/680910]. One print or electronic copy may be made for personal use only. Systematic or multiple reproduction, distribution to multiple locations via electronic or other means, duplication of any material in this paper for a fee or for commercial purposes, or modification of the content of the paper is prohibited and is subject to penalties under law. 25 p. application/pdf
institution Nanyang Technological University
building NTU Library
country Singapore
collection DR-NTU
language English
topic Philosophy
spellingShingle Philosophy
Greene, Preston
Sullivan, Meghan
Against Time Bias
description Most of us display a bias toward the near: we prefer pleasurable experiences to be in our near future and painful experiences to be in our distant future. We also display a bias toward the future: we prefer pleasurable experiences to be in our future and painful experiences to be in our past. While philosophers have tended to think that near bias is a rational defect, almost no one finds future bias objectionable. In this essay, we argue that this hybrid position is untenable. We conclude that those who reject near bias should instead endorse complete temporal neutrality.
author2 School of Humanities and Social Sciences
author_facet School of Humanities and Social Sciences
Greene, Preston
Sullivan, Meghan
format Article
author Greene, Preston
Sullivan, Meghan
author_sort Greene, Preston
title Against Time Bias
title_short Against Time Bias
title_full Against Time Bias
title_fullStr Against Time Bias
title_full_unstemmed Against Time Bias
title_sort against time bias
publishDate 2016
url https://hdl.handle.net/10356/79718
http://hdl.handle.net/10220/40397
_version_ 1681035116481085440