Interceptive side channel attack on AES-128 wireless communications for IoT applications
We propose wireless interceptive Side-Channel Attack (SCA) technique to reveal the 16-byte secret key of the AES-128 encryption algorithm in wireless communications, through Correlation Electromagnetic Analysis (CEMA) for Internet of Things (IoT) applications. The encrypted wireless communication li...
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sg-ntu-dr.10356-804782020-03-07T13:24:44Z Interceptive side channel attack on AES-128 wireless communications for IoT applications Pammu, Ali Akbar Chong, Kwen-Siong Ho, Weng-Geng Gwee, Bah Hwee School of Electrical and Electronic Engineering 2016 IEEE Asia Pacific Conference on Circuits and Systems (APCCAS) Centre for Integrated Circuits and Systems Electromagnetic attack Arduino We propose wireless interceptive Side-Channel Attack (SCA) technique to reveal the 16-byte secret key of the AES-128 encryption algorithm in wireless communications, through Correlation Electromagnetic Analysis (CEMA) for Internet of Things (IoT) applications. The encrypted wireless communication link is established using two ATmega-processor based Arduino boards. There are two key features in our proposed interceptive SCA technique. First, we identify the sensitive modules, which emit significant EM signal (physical leakage information) of the ATmega processor during the encryption process. The significant EM signals are highly correlated with processed data to reveal the secret key. Second, we investigate the resistance of AES-128 encryption algorithm implementation on ATmega processor against CEMA based SCA. The wireless signal is intercepted and correlated with EM signals generated during the encryption process. Based on our experimental results, the correlated EM signals leak out at the three modules - FLASH memory, data bus and SRAM modules during the encryption process are 101.56 dBμV, 105.34 dBμV and 121.79 dBμV respectively. In addition, we perform the CEMA attacks on the AES-128 implementation on the ATmega processor and the secret key is successfully revealed at 20,000 EM traces. ASTAR (Agency for Sci., Tech. and Research, S’pore) Accepted version 2017-03-13T08:18:17Z 2019-12-06T13:50:27Z 2017-03-13T08:18:17Z 2019-12-06T13:50:27Z 2016 Conference Paper Pammu, A. A., Chong, K.-S., Ho, W.-G., & Gwee, B. H. (2016). Interceptive side channel attack on AES-128 wireless communications for IoT applications. 2016 IEEE Asia Pacific Conference on Circuits and Systems (APCCAS), 650-653. https://hdl.handle.net/10356/80478 http://hdl.handle.net/10220/42163 10.1109/APCCAS.2016.7804081 en © 2016 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other uses, in any current or future media, including reprinting/republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works, for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted component of this work in other works. The published version is available at: [https://doi.org/10.1109/APCCAS.2016.7804081]. 4 p. application/pdf |
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Electromagnetic attack Arduino Pammu, Ali Akbar Chong, Kwen-Siong Ho, Weng-Geng Gwee, Bah Hwee Interceptive side channel attack on AES-128 wireless communications for IoT applications |
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We propose wireless interceptive Side-Channel Attack (SCA) technique to reveal the 16-byte secret key of the AES-128 encryption algorithm in wireless communications, through Correlation Electromagnetic Analysis (CEMA) for Internet of Things (IoT) applications. The encrypted wireless communication link is established using two ATmega-processor based Arduino boards. There are two key features in our proposed interceptive SCA technique. First, we identify the sensitive modules, which emit significant EM signal (physical leakage information) of the ATmega processor during the encryption process. The significant EM signals are highly correlated with processed data to reveal the secret key. Second, we investigate the resistance of AES-128 encryption algorithm implementation on ATmega processor against CEMA based SCA. The wireless signal is intercepted and correlated with EM signals generated during the encryption process. Based on our experimental results, the correlated EM signals leak out at the three modules - FLASH memory, data bus and SRAM modules during the encryption process are 101.56 dBμV, 105.34 dBμV and 121.79 dBμV respectively. In addition, we perform the CEMA attacks on the AES-128 implementation on the ATmega processor and the secret key is successfully revealed at 20,000 EM traces. |
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School of Electrical and Electronic Engineering |
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School of Electrical and Electronic Engineering Pammu, Ali Akbar Chong, Kwen-Siong Ho, Weng-Geng Gwee, Bah Hwee |
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Conference or Workshop Item |
author |
Pammu, Ali Akbar Chong, Kwen-Siong Ho, Weng-Geng Gwee, Bah Hwee |
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Pammu, Ali Akbar |
title |
Interceptive side channel attack on AES-128 wireless communications for IoT applications |
title_short |
Interceptive side channel attack on AES-128 wireless communications for IoT applications |
title_full |
Interceptive side channel attack on AES-128 wireless communications for IoT applications |
title_fullStr |
Interceptive side channel attack on AES-128 wireless communications for IoT applications |
title_full_unstemmed |
Interceptive side channel attack on AES-128 wireless communications for IoT applications |
title_sort |
interceptive side channel attack on aes-128 wireless communications for iot applications |
publishDate |
2017 |
url |
https://hdl.handle.net/10356/80478 http://hdl.handle.net/10220/42163 |
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1681049702948143104 |