Infection Spreading and Source Identification: A Hide and Seek Game
The goal of an infection source node (e.g., a rumor or computer virus source) in a network is to spread its infection to as many nodes as possible, while remaining hidden from the network administrator. On the other hand, the network administrator aims to identify the source node based on knowledge...
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sg-ntu-dr.10356-814682020-09-26T22:18:44Z Infection Spreading and Source Identification: A Hide and Seek Game Luo, Wuqiong Tay, Wee Peng Leng, Mei School of Electrical and Electronic Engineering Temasek Laboratories Infection source Rumor source The goal of an infection source node (e.g., a rumor or computer virus source) in a network is to spread its infection to as many nodes as possible, while remaining hidden from the network administrator. On the other hand, the network administrator aims to identify the source node based on knowledge of which nodes have been infected. We model the infection spreading and source identification problem as a strategic game, where the infection source and the network administrator are the two players. As the Jordan center estimator is a minimax source estimator that has been shown to be robust in recent works, we assume that the network administrator utilizes a source estimation strategy that can probe any nodes within a given radius of the Jordan center. Given any estimation strategy, we design a best-response infection strategy for the source. Given any infection strategy, we design a best-response estimation strategy for the network administrator. We derive conditions under which a Nash equilibrium of the strategic game exists. Simulations in both synthetic and real-world networks demonstrate that our proposed infection strategy infects more nodes while maintaining the same safety margin between the true source node and the Jordan center source estimator. MOE (Min. of Education, S’pore) Accepted version 2017-07-28T01:47:29Z 2019-12-06T14:31:42Z 2017-07-28T01:47:29Z 2019-12-06T14:31:42Z 2016 Journal Article Luo, W., Tay, W. P., & Leng, M. (2016). Infection Spreading and Source Identification: A Hide and Seek Game. IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing, 64(16), 4228-4243. 1053-587X https://hdl.handle.net/10356/81468 http://hdl.handle.net/10220/43480 10.1109/TSP.2016.2558168 en IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing © 2016 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other uses, in any current or future media, including reprinting/republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works, for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted component of this work in other works. The published version is available at: [http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TSP.2016.2558168]. 32 p. application/pdf |
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Infection source Rumor source Luo, Wuqiong Tay, Wee Peng Leng, Mei Infection Spreading and Source Identification: A Hide and Seek Game |
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The goal of an infection source node (e.g., a rumor or computer virus source) in a network is to spread its infection to as many nodes as possible, while remaining hidden from the network administrator. On the other hand, the network administrator aims to identify the source node based on knowledge of which nodes have been infected. We model the infection spreading and source identification problem as a strategic game, where the infection source and the network administrator are the two players. As the Jordan center estimator is a minimax source estimator that has been shown to be robust in recent works, we assume that the network administrator utilizes a source estimation strategy that can probe any nodes within a given radius of the Jordan center. Given any estimation strategy, we design a best-response infection strategy for the source. Given any infection strategy, we design a best-response estimation strategy for the network administrator. We derive conditions under which a Nash equilibrium of the strategic game exists. Simulations in both synthetic and real-world networks demonstrate that our proposed infection strategy infects more nodes while maintaining the same safety margin between the true source node and the Jordan center source estimator. |
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School of Electrical and Electronic Engineering |
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School of Electrical and Electronic Engineering Luo, Wuqiong Tay, Wee Peng Leng, Mei |
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Article |
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Luo, Wuqiong Tay, Wee Peng Leng, Mei |
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Luo, Wuqiong |
title |
Infection Spreading and Source Identification: A Hide and Seek Game |
title_short |
Infection Spreading and Source Identification: A Hide and Seek Game |
title_full |
Infection Spreading and Source Identification: A Hide and Seek Game |
title_fullStr |
Infection Spreading and Source Identification: A Hide and Seek Game |
title_full_unstemmed |
Infection Spreading and Source Identification: A Hide and Seek Game |
title_sort |
infection spreading and source identification: a hide and seek game |
publishDate |
2017 |
url |
https://hdl.handle.net/10356/81468 http://hdl.handle.net/10220/43480 |
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1681058604873940992 |