Practical Forgeries and Distinguishers against PAES
We present two practical attacks on the CAESAR candidate PAES. The first attack is a universal forgery for any plaintext with at least 240 bytes. It works for the nonce-repeating variant of PAES and in a nutshell it is a state recovery based on solving differential equations for the S-Box leaked thr...
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Main Authors: | , , , |
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格式: | Article |
語言: | English |
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2016
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在線閱讀: | https://hdl.handle.net/10356/82018 http://hdl.handle.net/10220/39784 |
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機構: | Nanyang Technological University |
語言: | English |