Strawson contra Strawson: Moral Responsibility and Semi-Compatibilism

This paper addresses the Basic Argument in favour of incompatibilism, both in its Strawsonian form and in its weakened form (the CDA). After examining the worries raised by this argument, I will defend a version of semi-compatibilism that is motivated by a narrative theory of the self, arguing that...

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Main Author: Chen, Melvin
Other Authors: School of Humanities and Social Sciences
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: 2016
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Online Access:https://hdl.handle.net/10356/82141
http://hdl.handle.net/10220/41116
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Institution: Nanyang Technological University
Language: English
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spelling sg-ntu-dr.10356-821412020-03-07T12:10:37Z Strawson contra Strawson: Moral Responsibility and Semi-Compatibilism Chen, Melvin School of Humanities and Social Sciences Semi-compatibilism Metaethics This paper addresses the Basic Argument in favour of incompatibilism, both in its Strawsonian form and in its weakened form (the CDA). After examining the worries raised by this argument, I will defend a version of semi-compatibilism that is motivated by a narrative theory of the self, arguing that moral responsibility is possible even if the thesis of determinism is taken to be incompatible with the thesis of freedom of will. The semi-compatibilist argument that I provide lowers the standard of proof, stops the regress of causes, finds a buck-stopper in the form of a self who can be held morally responsible for a choice or an action, and avoids committing the Strawsonian fallacy of circular reasoning by not setting impossible demands on moral responsibility. 2016-08-10T05:59:01Z 2019-12-06T14:47:30Z 2016-08-10T05:59:01Z 2019-12-06T14:47:30Z 2014 Journal Article Chen, M. (2014). Strawson contra Strawson: Moral Responsibility and Semi-Compatibilism. The Philosophical Forum, 45(1), 1-15. 0031-806X https://hdl.handle.net/10356/82141 http://hdl.handle.net/10220/41116 10.1111/phil.12024 en The Philosophical Forum © 2014 The Philosophical Forum, Inc.
institution Nanyang Technological University
building NTU Library
country Singapore
collection DR-NTU
language English
topic Semi-compatibilism
Metaethics
spellingShingle Semi-compatibilism
Metaethics
Chen, Melvin
Strawson contra Strawson: Moral Responsibility and Semi-Compatibilism
description This paper addresses the Basic Argument in favour of incompatibilism, both in its Strawsonian form and in its weakened form (the CDA). After examining the worries raised by this argument, I will defend a version of semi-compatibilism that is motivated by a narrative theory of the self, arguing that moral responsibility is possible even if the thesis of determinism is taken to be incompatible with the thesis of freedom of will. The semi-compatibilist argument that I provide lowers the standard of proof, stops the regress of causes, finds a buck-stopper in the form of a self who can be held morally responsible for a choice or an action, and avoids committing the Strawsonian fallacy of circular reasoning by not setting impossible demands on moral responsibility.
author2 School of Humanities and Social Sciences
author_facet School of Humanities and Social Sciences
Chen, Melvin
format Article
author Chen, Melvin
author_sort Chen, Melvin
title Strawson contra Strawson: Moral Responsibility and Semi-Compatibilism
title_short Strawson contra Strawson: Moral Responsibility and Semi-Compatibilism
title_full Strawson contra Strawson: Moral Responsibility and Semi-Compatibilism
title_fullStr Strawson contra Strawson: Moral Responsibility and Semi-Compatibilism
title_full_unstemmed Strawson contra Strawson: Moral Responsibility and Semi-Compatibilism
title_sort strawson contra strawson: moral responsibility and semi-compatibilism
publishDate 2016
url https://hdl.handle.net/10356/82141
http://hdl.handle.net/10220/41116
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