Does Competition Eliminate Discrimination? Evidence from the Commercial Sex Market in Singapore

The street sex worker market in Geylang, Singapore is a highly competitive market in which clients can search legally at negligible cost, making it ideal for testing Diamond’s hypothesis regarding search and monopoly pricing. As Diamond predicts, price discrimination survives in this market. Despite...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Li, Huailu, Lang, Kevin, Leong, Kaiwen
Other Authors: School of Humanities and Social Sciences
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: 2016
Subjects:
Online Access:https://hdl.handle.net/10356/83820
http://hdl.handle.net/10220/41581
http://www.nber.org/papers/w20911
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Institution: Nanyang Technological University
Language: English
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Summary:The street sex worker market in Geylang, Singapore is a highly competitive market in which clients can search legally at negligible cost, making it ideal for testing Diamond’s hypothesis regarding search and monopoly pricing. As Diamond predicts, price discrimination survives in this market. Despite an excess supply of workers, but consistent with their self-reported attitudes and beliefs, sex workers charge Caucasians (Bangladeshis) more (less), based on perceived willingness to pay, and are more (less) likely to approach and reach an agreement with them. Consistent with taste discrimination, they avoid Indians, charge more and reach an agreement with them less frequently.