Closed-loop supply chain based battery swapping and charging system operation : a hierarchy game approach

To realize optimal day-ahead operation of battery swapping and charging systems (BSCSs), a closed loop supply chain (CLSC) based management scheme is proposed, where the game theory is adopted for benefits allocation. The CLSC is used to depict the battery-swapping-charging process between the batte...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Zhao, Tianyang, Zhang, Jianhua, Wang, Peng
Other Authors: School of Electrical and Electronic Engineering
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: 2019
Subjects:
Online Access:https://hdl.handle.net/10356/86247
http://hdl.handle.net/10220/49281
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
Institution: Nanyang Technological University
Language: English
id sg-ntu-dr.10356-86247
record_format dspace
spelling sg-ntu-dr.10356-862472021-01-05T07:46:46Z Closed-loop supply chain based battery swapping and charging system operation : a hierarchy game approach Zhao, Tianyang Zhang, Jianhua Wang, Peng School of Electrical and Electronic Engineering Energy Research Institute @ NTU (ERI@N) Closed-loop Supply Chain Battery Swapping Engineering::Electrical and electronic engineering To realize optimal day-ahead operation of battery swapping and charging systems (BSCSs), a closed loop supply chain (CLSC) based management scheme is proposed, where the game theory is adopted for benefits allocation. The CLSC is used to depict the battery-swapping-charging process between the battery charging stations (BCSs) and battery swapping stations (BSSs). The arrival, departure and swapping service of electric vehicles (EVs) at BSSs is modeled as distinct queues based on the network calculus theory. The depleted batteries (DBs) and well-charging batteries (WBs) based interaction among BCSs and BSSs is formulated as a Stackelberg game. In the game, one BCS acts as the leader and the BSSs act as the followers. The BCS sets optimized prices to maximize its utility and the BSSs optimally demand WBs, supply DBs and provide battery swapping services to maximize their own utilities while guaranteeing the quality of service (QoS) needed for battery swapping. The existence of Stackelberg equilibriums (SEs) of the proposed game is proved. A differential evaluation based hybrid algorithm is proposed to compute an SE. The effectiveness of proposed method has been demonstrated by the simulation results, guaranteeing the QoS and balancing benefits among the BCS and BSSs while maximizing social welfare. Published version 2019-07-11T04:12:06Z 2019-12-06T16:18:49Z 2019-07-11T04:12:06Z 2019-12-06T16:18:49Z 2019 Journal Article Zhao, T., Zhang, J., & Wang, P. (2019). Closed-loop supply chain based battery swapping and charging system operation : a hierarchy game approach. CSEE Journal of Power and Energy Systems, 5(1), 35-45. doi:10.17775/CSEEJPES.2016.00820 2096-0042 https://hdl.handle.net/10356/86247 http://hdl.handle.net/10220/49281 10.17775/CSEEJPES.2016.00820 en CSEE Journal of Power and Energy Systems © 2016 CSEE (published by IEEE). This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License. 11 p. application/pdf
institution Nanyang Technological University
building NTU Library
continent Asia
country Singapore
Singapore
content_provider NTU Library
collection DR-NTU
language English
topic Closed-loop Supply Chain
Battery Swapping
Engineering::Electrical and electronic engineering
spellingShingle Closed-loop Supply Chain
Battery Swapping
Engineering::Electrical and electronic engineering
Zhao, Tianyang
Zhang, Jianhua
Wang, Peng
Closed-loop supply chain based battery swapping and charging system operation : a hierarchy game approach
description To realize optimal day-ahead operation of battery swapping and charging systems (BSCSs), a closed loop supply chain (CLSC) based management scheme is proposed, where the game theory is adopted for benefits allocation. The CLSC is used to depict the battery-swapping-charging process between the battery charging stations (BCSs) and battery swapping stations (BSSs). The arrival, departure and swapping service of electric vehicles (EVs) at BSSs is modeled as distinct queues based on the network calculus theory. The depleted batteries (DBs) and well-charging batteries (WBs) based interaction among BCSs and BSSs is formulated as a Stackelberg game. In the game, one BCS acts as the leader and the BSSs act as the followers. The BCS sets optimized prices to maximize its utility and the BSSs optimally demand WBs, supply DBs and provide battery swapping services to maximize their own utilities while guaranteeing the quality of service (QoS) needed for battery swapping. The existence of Stackelberg equilibriums (SEs) of the proposed game is proved. A differential evaluation based hybrid algorithm is proposed to compute an SE. The effectiveness of proposed method has been demonstrated by the simulation results, guaranteeing the QoS and balancing benefits among the BCS and BSSs while maximizing social welfare.
author2 School of Electrical and Electronic Engineering
author_facet School of Electrical and Electronic Engineering
Zhao, Tianyang
Zhang, Jianhua
Wang, Peng
format Article
author Zhao, Tianyang
Zhang, Jianhua
Wang, Peng
author_sort Zhao, Tianyang
title Closed-loop supply chain based battery swapping and charging system operation : a hierarchy game approach
title_short Closed-loop supply chain based battery swapping and charging system operation : a hierarchy game approach
title_full Closed-loop supply chain based battery swapping and charging system operation : a hierarchy game approach
title_fullStr Closed-loop supply chain based battery swapping and charging system operation : a hierarchy game approach
title_full_unstemmed Closed-loop supply chain based battery swapping and charging system operation : a hierarchy game approach
title_sort closed-loop supply chain based battery swapping and charging system operation : a hierarchy game approach
publishDate 2019
url https://hdl.handle.net/10356/86247
http://hdl.handle.net/10220/49281
_version_ 1688665689508806656