Closed-loop supply chain based battery swapping and charging system operation : a hierarchy game approach
To realize optimal day-ahead operation of battery swapping and charging systems (BSCSs), a closed loop supply chain (CLSC) based management scheme is proposed, where the game theory is adopted for benefits allocation. The CLSC is used to depict the battery-swapping-charging process between the batte...
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sg-ntu-dr.10356-862472021-01-05T07:46:46Z Closed-loop supply chain based battery swapping and charging system operation : a hierarchy game approach Zhao, Tianyang Zhang, Jianhua Wang, Peng School of Electrical and Electronic Engineering Energy Research Institute @ NTU (ERI@N) Closed-loop Supply Chain Battery Swapping Engineering::Electrical and electronic engineering To realize optimal day-ahead operation of battery swapping and charging systems (BSCSs), a closed loop supply chain (CLSC) based management scheme is proposed, where the game theory is adopted for benefits allocation. The CLSC is used to depict the battery-swapping-charging process between the battery charging stations (BCSs) and battery swapping stations (BSSs). The arrival, departure and swapping service of electric vehicles (EVs) at BSSs is modeled as distinct queues based on the network calculus theory. The depleted batteries (DBs) and well-charging batteries (WBs) based interaction among BCSs and BSSs is formulated as a Stackelberg game. In the game, one BCS acts as the leader and the BSSs act as the followers. The BCS sets optimized prices to maximize its utility and the BSSs optimally demand WBs, supply DBs and provide battery swapping services to maximize their own utilities while guaranteeing the quality of service (QoS) needed for battery swapping. The existence of Stackelberg equilibriums (SEs) of the proposed game is proved. A differential evaluation based hybrid algorithm is proposed to compute an SE. The effectiveness of proposed method has been demonstrated by the simulation results, guaranteeing the QoS and balancing benefits among the BCS and BSSs while maximizing social welfare. Published version 2019-07-11T04:12:06Z 2019-12-06T16:18:49Z 2019-07-11T04:12:06Z 2019-12-06T16:18:49Z 2019 Journal Article Zhao, T., Zhang, J., & Wang, P. (2019). Closed-loop supply chain based battery swapping and charging system operation : a hierarchy game approach. CSEE Journal of Power and Energy Systems, 5(1), 35-45. doi:10.17775/CSEEJPES.2016.00820 2096-0042 https://hdl.handle.net/10356/86247 http://hdl.handle.net/10220/49281 10.17775/CSEEJPES.2016.00820 en CSEE Journal of Power and Energy Systems © 2016 CSEE (published by IEEE). This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License. 11 p. application/pdf |
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Closed-loop Supply Chain Battery Swapping Engineering::Electrical and electronic engineering Zhao, Tianyang Zhang, Jianhua Wang, Peng Closed-loop supply chain based battery swapping and charging system operation : a hierarchy game approach |
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To realize optimal day-ahead operation of battery swapping and charging systems (BSCSs), a closed loop supply chain (CLSC) based management scheme is proposed, where the game theory is adopted for benefits allocation. The CLSC is used to depict the battery-swapping-charging process between the battery charging stations (BCSs) and battery swapping stations (BSSs). The arrival, departure and swapping service of electric vehicles (EVs) at BSSs is modeled as distinct queues based on the network calculus theory. The depleted batteries (DBs) and well-charging batteries (WBs) based interaction among BCSs and BSSs is formulated as a Stackelberg game. In the game, one BCS acts as the leader and the BSSs act as the followers. The BCS sets optimized prices to maximize its utility and the BSSs optimally demand WBs, supply DBs and provide battery swapping services to maximize their own utilities while guaranteeing the quality of service (QoS) needed for battery swapping. The existence of Stackelberg equilibriums (SEs) of the proposed game is proved. A differential evaluation based hybrid algorithm is proposed to compute an SE. The effectiveness of proposed method has been demonstrated by the simulation results, guaranteeing the QoS and balancing benefits among the BCS and BSSs while maximizing social welfare. |
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School of Electrical and Electronic Engineering |
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School of Electrical and Electronic Engineering Zhao, Tianyang Zhang, Jianhua Wang, Peng |
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Article |
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Zhao, Tianyang Zhang, Jianhua Wang, Peng |
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Zhao, Tianyang |
title |
Closed-loop supply chain based battery swapping and charging system operation : a hierarchy game approach |
title_short |
Closed-loop supply chain based battery swapping and charging system operation : a hierarchy game approach |
title_full |
Closed-loop supply chain based battery swapping and charging system operation : a hierarchy game approach |
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Closed-loop supply chain based battery swapping and charging system operation : a hierarchy game approach |
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Closed-loop supply chain based battery swapping and charging system operation : a hierarchy game approach |
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closed-loop supply chain based battery swapping and charging system operation : a hierarchy game approach |
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2019 |
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https://hdl.handle.net/10356/86247 http://hdl.handle.net/10220/49281 |
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