What next for the Indonesian's navy? Challenges and prospects for attaining the minimum essential force by 2024

A greenwater navy ought to be effective within its country’s immediate waters, especially the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) while also possessing a limited extra-regional force projection ability. Based on this definition, the Indonesian Navy does not adequately perform this dual role. While Preside...

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Main Author: Koh, Collin Swee Lean
Other Authors: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: 2018
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Online Access:https://hdl.handle.net/10356/87861
http://hdl.handle.net/10220/46875
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Institution: Nanyang Technological University
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spelling sg-ntu-dr.10356-878612019-12-06T16:50:55Z What next for the Indonesian's navy? Challenges and prospects for attaining the minimum essential force by 2024 Koh, Collin Swee Lean S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies DRNTU::Social sciences::Sociology Indonesia Navy A greenwater navy ought to be effective within its country’s immediate waters, especially the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) while also possessing a limited extra-regional force projection ability. Based on this definition, the Indonesian Navy does not adequately perform this dual role. While President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo’s Global Maritime Fulcrum (GMF) vision gives the navy’s long-term greenwater ambitions greater traction, it still faces capacity-building constraints thus prompting it to adopt the Minimum Essential Force (MEF) blueprint as an interim measure. This article examines the Indonesian Navy’s prospects of attaining its MEF targets by 2024 as part of its long-term greenwater naval ambitions commensurate with Indonesia’s “maritime medium-ness”. To identify these capacity gaps, this article models the navy’s MEF projections based on three scenarios: Standard, Optimistic and Austere. Results show that under an Austere Scenario, the navy cannot possibly achieve its MEF targets across all categories by 2024. The Optimistic and Standard Scenarios are more realistic. Gaps in certain categories, primarily the PKR-10514 light frigate programme which forms a key facet of the navy’s greenwater aspirations, are identified. But the risks of project overruns and budget challenges may militate against the modest projections derived in this study. Therefore, this article proposes a recalibration of the MEF specifications, by reducing the number of high-capability PKR-10514s optimized for warfighting in exchange for a larger force of low-capability “PKR-minus” optimized for EEZ duties. 2018-12-07T06:00:40Z 2019-12-06T16:50:55Z 2018-12-07T06:00:40Z 2019-12-06T16:50:55Z 2015 Journal Article Koh, C. S. L. (2015). What next for the Indonesian's navy? Challenges and prospects for attaining the minimum essential force by 2024. Contemporary Southeast Asia, 37(3), 432-462. 0129-797X https://hdl.handle.net/10356/87861 http://hdl.handle.net/10220/46875 en Contemporary Southeast Asia © 2015 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies Publishing (ISEAS Publishing).
institution Nanyang Technological University
building NTU Library
country Singapore
collection DR-NTU
language English
topic DRNTU::Social sciences::Sociology
Indonesia
Navy
spellingShingle DRNTU::Social sciences::Sociology
Indonesia
Navy
Koh, Collin Swee Lean
What next for the Indonesian's navy? Challenges and prospects for attaining the minimum essential force by 2024
description A greenwater navy ought to be effective within its country’s immediate waters, especially the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) while also possessing a limited extra-regional force projection ability. Based on this definition, the Indonesian Navy does not adequately perform this dual role. While President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo’s Global Maritime Fulcrum (GMF) vision gives the navy’s long-term greenwater ambitions greater traction, it still faces capacity-building constraints thus prompting it to adopt the Minimum Essential Force (MEF) blueprint as an interim measure. This article examines the Indonesian Navy’s prospects of attaining its MEF targets by 2024 as part of its long-term greenwater naval ambitions commensurate with Indonesia’s “maritime medium-ness”. To identify these capacity gaps, this article models the navy’s MEF projections based on three scenarios: Standard, Optimistic and Austere. Results show that under an Austere Scenario, the navy cannot possibly achieve its MEF targets across all categories by 2024. The Optimistic and Standard Scenarios are more realistic. Gaps in certain categories, primarily the PKR-10514 light frigate programme which forms a key facet of the navy’s greenwater aspirations, are identified. But the risks of project overruns and budget challenges may militate against the modest projections derived in this study. Therefore, this article proposes a recalibration of the MEF specifications, by reducing the number of high-capability PKR-10514s optimized for warfighting in exchange for a larger force of low-capability “PKR-minus” optimized for EEZ duties.
author2 S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
author_facet S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Koh, Collin Swee Lean
format Article
author Koh, Collin Swee Lean
author_sort Koh, Collin Swee Lean
title What next for the Indonesian's navy? Challenges and prospects for attaining the minimum essential force by 2024
title_short What next for the Indonesian's navy? Challenges and prospects for attaining the minimum essential force by 2024
title_full What next for the Indonesian's navy? Challenges and prospects for attaining the minimum essential force by 2024
title_fullStr What next for the Indonesian's navy? Challenges and prospects for attaining the minimum essential force by 2024
title_full_unstemmed What next for the Indonesian's navy? Challenges and prospects for attaining the minimum essential force by 2024
title_sort what next for the indonesian's navy? challenges and prospects for attaining the minimum essential force by 2024
publishDate 2018
url https://hdl.handle.net/10356/87861
http://hdl.handle.net/10220/46875
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