A Practical Fault Attack on ARX-Like Ciphers with a Case Study on ChaCha20

This paper presents the first practical fault attack on the ChaCha family of addition-rotation-XOR (ARX)-based stream ciphers. ChaCha has recently been deployed for speeding up and strengthening HTTPS connections for Google Chrome on Android devices. In this paper, we propose differential fault anal...

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Main Authors: Kumar, S. V. Dilip, Patranabis, Sikhar, Breier, Jakub, Mukhopadhyay, Debdeep, Bhasin, Shivam, Chattopadhyay, Anupam, Baksi, Anubhab
Other Authors: School of Computer Science and Engineering
Format: Conference or Workshop Item
Language:English
Published: 2018
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Online Access:https://hdl.handle.net/10356/88733
http://hdl.handle.net/10220/44739
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Institution: Nanyang Technological University
Language: English
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spelling sg-ntu-dr.10356-887332020-03-07T11:48:46Z A Practical Fault Attack on ARX-Like Ciphers with a Case Study on ChaCha20 Kumar, S. V. Dilip Patranabis, Sikhar Breier, Jakub Mukhopadhyay, Debdeep Bhasin, Shivam Chattopadhyay, Anupam Baksi, Anubhab School of Computer Science and Engineering 2017 Workshop on Fault Diagnosis and Tolerance in Cryptography (FDTC) Temasek Laboratories ChaCha ARX Cipher This paper presents the first practical fault attack on the ChaCha family of addition-rotation-XOR (ARX)-based stream ciphers. ChaCha has recently been deployed for speeding up and strengthening HTTPS connections for Google Chrome on Android devices. In this paper, we propose differential fault analysis attacks on ChaCha without resorting to nonce misuse. We use the instruction skip and instruction replacement fault models, which are popularly mounted on microcontroller-based cryptographic implementations. We corroborate the attack propositions via practical fault injection experiments using a laser-based setup targeting an Atmel AVR 8-bit microcontroller-based implementation of ChaCha. Each of the proposed attacks can be repeated with 100% accuracy in our fault injection setup, and can recover the entire 256 bit secret key using 5-8 fault injections on an average. Accepted version 2018-05-03T05:03:34Z 2019-12-06T17:09:49Z 2018-05-03T05:03:34Z 2019-12-06T17:09:49Z 2017-12-01 2017 Conference Paper Kumar, S. V. D., Patranabis, S., Breier, J., Mukhopadhyay, D., Bhasin, S., Chattopadhyay, A., et al. (2017). A Practical Fault Attack on ARX-Like Ciphers with a Case Study on ChaCha20. 2017 Workshop on Fault Diagnosis and Tolerance in Cryptography, 33-40. https://hdl.handle.net/10356/88733 http://hdl.handle.net/10220/44739 10.1109/FDTC.2017.14 206826 en © 2017 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other uses, in any current or future media, including reprinting/republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works, for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted component of this work in other works. The published version is available at: [http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/FDTC.2017.14]. 8 p. application/pdf
institution Nanyang Technological University
building NTU Library
country Singapore
collection DR-NTU
language English
topic ChaCha
ARX Cipher
spellingShingle ChaCha
ARX Cipher
Kumar, S. V. Dilip
Patranabis, Sikhar
Breier, Jakub
Mukhopadhyay, Debdeep
Bhasin, Shivam
Chattopadhyay, Anupam
Baksi, Anubhab
A Practical Fault Attack on ARX-Like Ciphers with a Case Study on ChaCha20
description This paper presents the first practical fault attack on the ChaCha family of addition-rotation-XOR (ARX)-based stream ciphers. ChaCha has recently been deployed for speeding up and strengthening HTTPS connections for Google Chrome on Android devices. In this paper, we propose differential fault analysis attacks on ChaCha without resorting to nonce misuse. We use the instruction skip and instruction replacement fault models, which are popularly mounted on microcontroller-based cryptographic implementations. We corroborate the attack propositions via practical fault injection experiments using a laser-based setup targeting an Atmel AVR 8-bit microcontroller-based implementation of ChaCha. Each of the proposed attacks can be repeated with 100% accuracy in our fault injection setup, and can recover the entire 256 bit secret key using 5-8 fault injections on an average.
author2 School of Computer Science and Engineering
author_facet School of Computer Science and Engineering
Kumar, S. V. Dilip
Patranabis, Sikhar
Breier, Jakub
Mukhopadhyay, Debdeep
Bhasin, Shivam
Chattopadhyay, Anupam
Baksi, Anubhab
format Conference or Workshop Item
author Kumar, S. V. Dilip
Patranabis, Sikhar
Breier, Jakub
Mukhopadhyay, Debdeep
Bhasin, Shivam
Chattopadhyay, Anupam
Baksi, Anubhab
author_sort Kumar, S. V. Dilip
title A Practical Fault Attack on ARX-Like Ciphers with a Case Study on ChaCha20
title_short A Practical Fault Attack on ARX-Like Ciphers with a Case Study on ChaCha20
title_full A Practical Fault Attack on ARX-Like Ciphers with a Case Study on ChaCha20
title_fullStr A Practical Fault Attack on ARX-Like Ciphers with a Case Study on ChaCha20
title_full_unstemmed A Practical Fault Attack on ARX-Like Ciphers with a Case Study on ChaCha20
title_sort practical fault attack on arx-like ciphers with a case study on chacha20
publishDate 2018
url https://hdl.handle.net/10356/88733
http://hdl.handle.net/10220/44739
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