Towards Threat of Implementation Attacks on Substation Security: Case Study on Fault Detection and Isolation

Modern and future substations are aimed to be more interconnected, leveraging communication standards like IEC 61850-9-2, and associated abstract data models and communication services like GOOSE, MMS, SMV. Such interconnection would enable fast and secure data transfer, sharing of the analytics inf...

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Main Authors: Chattopadhyay, Anupam, Ukil, Abhisek, Jap, Dirmanto, Bhasin, Shivam
Other Authors: School of Computer Science and Engineering
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: 2018
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Online Access:https://hdl.handle.net/10356/88768
http://hdl.handle.net/10220/44733
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Institution: Nanyang Technological University
Language: English
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spelling sg-ntu-dr.10356-887682020-09-26T22:17:55Z Towards Threat of Implementation Attacks on Substation Security: Case Study on Fault Detection and Isolation Chattopadhyay, Anupam Ukil, Abhisek Jap, Dirmanto Bhasin, Shivam School of Computer Science and Engineering Temasek Laboratories Implementation Attack Distribution Automation Modern and future substations are aimed to be more interconnected, leveraging communication standards like IEC 61850-9-2, and associated abstract data models and communication services like GOOSE, MMS, SMV. Such interconnection would enable fast and secure data transfer, sharing of the analytics information for various purposes like wide area monitoring, faster outage recovery, blackout prevention, distributed state estimation, etc. This would require strong focus on communication security, both at system level as well as at embedded device level. Although communication level security is dealt in IEC 62351, implementation attack on embedded system is not considered. Since embedded system makes the core of smart grid, in this paper, we take a deeper look into impact of implementation attacks on substation security. An overview of potential exploits is first provided. This is followed by a case study, where implementation attacks like malicious fault injection attacks and hardware Trojan are used to compromise a substation level intelligent electronic device (IED). The studied scenario extend implementation attacks beyond its usual exploit of confidentiality to affect power grid integrity and availability. Accepted version 2018-05-02T06:46:21Z 2019-12-06T17:10:33Z 2018-05-02T06:46:21Z 2019-12-06T17:10:33Z 2017 2017 Journal Article Chattopadhyay, A., Ukil, A., Jap, D., & Bhasin, S. (2018). Towards Threat of Implementation Attacks on Substation Security: Case Study on Fault Detection and Isolation. IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics, in press. 1551-3203 https://hdl.handle.net/10356/88768 http://hdl.handle.net/10220/44733 10.1109/TII.2017.2770096 206821 en IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics © 2017 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other uses, in any current or future media, including reprinting/republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works, for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted component of this work in other works. The published version is available at: [http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TII.2017.2770096]. 10 p. application/pdf
institution Nanyang Technological University
building NTU Library
country Singapore
collection DR-NTU
language English
topic Implementation Attack
Distribution Automation
spellingShingle Implementation Attack
Distribution Automation
Chattopadhyay, Anupam
Ukil, Abhisek
Jap, Dirmanto
Bhasin, Shivam
Towards Threat of Implementation Attacks on Substation Security: Case Study on Fault Detection and Isolation
description Modern and future substations are aimed to be more interconnected, leveraging communication standards like IEC 61850-9-2, and associated abstract data models and communication services like GOOSE, MMS, SMV. Such interconnection would enable fast and secure data transfer, sharing of the analytics information for various purposes like wide area monitoring, faster outage recovery, blackout prevention, distributed state estimation, etc. This would require strong focus on communication security, both at system level as well as at embedded device level. Although communication level security is dealt in IEC 62351, implementation attack on embedded system is not considered. Since embedded system makes the core of smart grid, in this paper, we take a deeper look into impact of implementation attacks on substation security. An overview of potential exploits is first provided. This is followed by a case study, where implementation attacks like malicious fault injection attacks and hardware Trojan are used to compromise a substation level intelligent electronic device (IED). The studied scenario extend implementation attacks beyond its usual exploit of confidentiality to affect power grid integrity and availability.
author2 School of Computer Science and Engineering
author_facet School of Computer Science and Engineering
Chattopadhyay, Anupam
Ukil, Abhisek
Jap, Dirmanto
Bhasin, Shivam
format Article
author Chattopadhyay, Anupam
Ukil, Abhisek
Jap, Dirmanto
Bhasin, Shivam
author_sort Chattopadhyay, Anupam
title Towards Threat of Implementation Attacks on Substation Security: Case Study on Fault Detection and Isolation
title_short Towards Threat of Implementation Attacks on Substation Security: Case Study on Fault Detection and Isolation
title_full Towards Threat of Implementation Attacks on Substation Security: Case Study on Fault Detection and Isolation
title_fullStr Towards Threat of Implementation Attacks on Substation Security: Case Study on Fault Detection and Isolation
title_full_unstemmed Towards Threat of Implementation Attacks on Substation Security: Case Study on Fault Detection and Isolation
title_sort towards threat of implementation attacks on substation security: case study on fault detection and isolation
publishDate 2018
url https://hdl.handle.net/10356/88768
http://hdl.handle.net/10220/44733
_version_ 1681057598202183680