Korean war June-October 1950 : Inchon and Stalin in the "trigger vs. justification" debate

China's decision to enter the Korean War in 1950 is a historical puzzle: why would China, a much weaker country, enter into a military confrontation with the United Korea carries strategic lessons for the contemporary crisis on the Korean Peninsula, as well as for Sino-American relations. Utili...

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Main Author: Tan, Jack Kwoh
Other Authors: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Format: Working Paper
Published: 2009
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Online Access:https://hdl.handle.net/10356/90667
http://hdl.handle.net/10220/4403
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spelling sg-ntu-dr.10356-906672020-11-01T08:50:38Z Korean war June-October 1950 : Inchon and Stalin in the "trigger vs. justification" debate Tan, Jack Kwoh S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies DRNTU::Social sciences::Military and naval science China's decision to enter the Korean War in 1950 is a historical puzzle: why would China, a much weaker country, enter into a military confrontation with the United Korea carries strategic lessons for the contemporary crisis on the Korean Peninsula, as well as for Sino-American relations. Utilizing newly declassified Russian documents made available at the Cold War International History Project from 1994-2004, this paper critically assesses this new evidence concurrently with the existing literature that has emerged so far, and seeks to contribute to the "trigger vs. justification" debate surrounding China's entry. Three shortcomings of this debate are identified: 1) whether Mao would have intervened had the US military stopped at the 38th parallel is difficult to determine; 2) Mao's vacillations up till the very last minute cast doubt on the justification arguement i.e. offensive intervention driven by revolutionary ideology and politics; and 3) as a result, this ignores the complex dimensions of decision-making and interaction between Stalin and the Chinese leadership, as well as within the Chinese leadership itself. This paper argues that one significant variable overlooked heretofore is the American landings at Inchon on 19 September 1950. This is followed by in-depth analyses of the following three main interactions that Inchon engendered - 1) the policy shifts within the Truman administration; 2) the Stalin-Mao manoeuvres; and 3) the debates and dilemmas within the Chinese Politburo. This paper concludes that it was Inchon, along with additional pressure from Stalin, and not the crossing of the 38th parallel, that triggered China's eventual entry into Korea. 2009-02-05T09:32:29Z 2019-12-06T17:51:50Z 2009-02-05T09:32:29Z 2019-12-06T17:51:50Z 2006 2006 Working Paper Tan, J. K. (2006). Korean war June-October 1950 : Inchon and Stalin in the "trigger vs. justification" debate. (RSIS Working Paper, No. 105). Singapore: Nanyang Technological University. https://hdl.handle.net/10356/90667 http://hdl.handle.net/10220/4403 RSIS Working Papers ; 105/06 Nanyang Technological University 52 p. application/pdf
institution Nanyang Technological University
building NTU Library
continent Asia
country Singapore
Singapore
content_provider NTU Library
collection DR-NTU
topic DRNTU::Social sciences::Military and naval science
spellingShingle DRNTU::Social sciences::Military and naval science
Tan, Jack Kwoh
Korean war June-October 1950 : Inchon and Stalin in the "trigger vs. justification" debate
description China's decision to enter the Korean War in 1950 is a historical puzzle: why would China, a much weaker country, enter into a military confrontation with the United Korea carries strategic lessons for the contemporary crisis on the Korean Peninsula, as well as for Sino-American relations. Utilizing newly declassified Russian documents made available at the Cold War International History Project from 1994-2004, this paper critically assesses this new evidence concurrently with the existing literature that has emerged so far, and seeks to contribute to the "trigger vs. justification" debate surrounding China's entry. Three shortcomings of this debate are identified: 1) whether Mao would have intervened had the US military stopped at the 38th parallel is difficult to determine; 2) Mao's vacillations up till the very last minute cast doubt on the justification arguement i.e. offensive intervention driven by revolutionary ideology and politics; and 3) as a result, this ignores the complex dimensions of decision-making and interaction between Stalin and the Chinese leadership, as well as within the Chinese leadership itself. This paper argues that one significant variable overlooked heretofore is the American landings at Inchon on 19 September 1950. This is followed by in-depth analyses of the following three main interactions that Inchon engendered - 1) the policy shifts within the Truman administration; 2) the Stalin-Mao manoeuvres; and 3) the debates and dilemmas within the Chinese Politburo. This paper concludes that it was Inchon, along with additional pressure from Stalin, and not the crossing of the 38th parallel, that triggered China's eventual entry into Korea.
author2 S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
author_facet S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Tan, Jack Kwoh
format Working Paper
author Tan, Jack Kwoh
author_sort Tan, Jack Kwoh
title Korean war June-October 1950 : Inchon and Stalin in the "trigger vs. justification" debate
title_short Korean war June-October 1950 : Inchon and Stalin in the "trigger vs. justification" debate
title_full Korean war June-October 1950 : Inchon and Stalin in the "trigger vs. justification" debate
title_fullStr Korean war June-October 1950 : Inchon and Stalin in the "trigger vs. justification" debate
title_full_unstemmed Korean war June-October 1950 : Inchon and Stalin in the "trigger vs. justification" debate
title_sort korean war june-october 1950 : inchon and stalin in the "trigger vs. justification" debate
publishDate 2009
url https://hdl.handle.net/10356/90667
http://hdl.handle.net/10220/4403
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