Cryptanalysis of the LAKE hash family

We analyse the security of the cryptographic hash function LAKE-256 proposed at FSE 2008 by Aumasson, Meier and Phan. By exploiting non-injectivity of some of the building primitives of LAKE, we show three different collision and near-collision attacks on the compression function. The first attack u...

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Main Authors: Biryukov, Alex, Gauravaram, Praveen, Guo, Jian, Khovratovich, Dmitry, Ling, San, Matusiewicz, Krystian, Nikoli´c, Ivica, Pieprzyk, Josef, Wang, Huaxiong
Other Authors: School of Physical and Mathematical Sciences
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: 2012
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Online Access:https://hdl.handle.net/10356/94927
http://hdl.handle.net/10220/7722
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Institution: Nanyang Technological University
Language: English
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spelling sg-ntu-dr.10356-949272023-02-28T19:38:33Z Cryptanalysis of the LAKE hash family Biryukov, Alex Gauravaram, Praveen Guo, Jian Khovratovich, Dmitry Ling, San Matusiewicz, Krystian Nikoli´c, Ivica Pieprzyk, Josef Wang, Huaxiong School of Physical and Mathematical Sciences DRNTU::Science::Mathematics We analyse the security of the cryptographic hash function LAKE-256 proposed at FSE 2008 by Aumasson, Meier and Phan. By exploiting non-injectivity of some of the building primitives of LAKE, we show three different collision and near-collision attacks on the compression function. The first attack uses differences in the chaining values and the block counter and finds collisions with complexity 233. The second attack utilizes differences in the chaining values and salt and yields collisions with complexity 242. The final attack uses differences only in the chaining values to yield near-collisions with complexity 299. All our attacks are independent of the number of rounds in the compression function. We illustrate the first two attacks by showing examples of collisions and near-collisions. Accepted version 2012-04-11T06:09:44Z 2019-12-06T19:04:51Z 2012-04-11T06:09:44Z 2019-12-06T19:04:51Z 2009 2009 Journal Article Biryukov, A., Gauravaram, P., Guo, J., Khovratovich, D., Ling, S., Matusiewicz, K., et al. (2009). Cryptanalysis of the LAKE hash family. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 5665, 156-179. https://hdl.handle.net/10356/94927 http://hdl.handle.net/10220/7722 10.1007/978-3-642-03317-9_10 en Lecture notes in computer science © 2009 International Association for Cryptologic Research.This is the author created version of a work that has been peer reviewed and accepted for publication by Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer on behalf of International Association for Cryptologic Research. It incorporates referee’s comments but changes resulting from the publishing process, such as copyediting, structural formatting, may not be reflected in this document. The published version is available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-03317-9_10 24 p. application/pdf
institution Nanyang Technological University
building NTU Library
continent Asia
country Singapore
Singapore
content_provider NTU Library
collection DR-NTU
language English
topic DRNTU::Science::Mathematics
spellingShingle DRNTU::Science::Mathematics
Biryukov, Alex
Gauravaram, Praveen
Guo, Jian
Khovratovich, Dmitry
Ling, San
Matusiewicz, Krystian
Nikoli´c, Ivica
Pieprzyk, Josef
Wang, Huaxiong
Cryptanalysis of the LAKE hash family
description We analyse the security of the cryptographic hash function LAKE-256 proposed at FSE 2008 by Aumasson, Meier and Phan. By exploiting non-injectivity of some of the building primitives of LAKE, we show three different collision and near-collision attacks on the compression function. The first attack uses differences in the chaining values and the block counter and finds collisions with complexity 233. The second attack utilizes differences in the chaining values and salt and yields collisions with complexity 242. The final attack uses differences only in the chaining values to yield near-collisions with complexity 299. All our attacks are independent of the number of rounds in the compression function. We illustrate the first two attacks by showing examples of collisions and near-collisions.
author2 School of Physical and Mathematical Sciences
author_facet School of Physical and Mathematical Sciences
Biryukov, Alex
Gauravaram, Praveen
Guo, Jian
Khovratovich, Dmitry
Ling, San
Matusiewicz, Krystian
Nikoli´c, Ivica
Pieprzyk, Josef
Wang, Huaxiong
format Article
author Biryukov, Alex
Gauravaram, Praveen
Guo, Jian
Khovratovich, Dmitry
Ling, San
Matusiewicz, Krystian
Nikoli´c, Ivica
Pieprzyk, Josef
Wang, Huaxiong
author_sort Biryukov, Alex
title Cryptanalysis of the LAKE hash family
title_short Cryptanalysis of the LAKE hash family
title_full Cryptanalysis of the LAKE hash family
title_fullStr Cryptanalysis of the LAKE hash family
title_full_unstemmed Cryptanalysis of the LAKE hash family
title_sort cryptanalysis of the lake hash family
publishDate 2012
url https://hdl.handle.net/10356/94927
http://hdl.handle.net/10220/7722
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