Determinants of the guarantee circles : the case of Chinese listed firms

China's external capital market has been developing rapidly since the establishment of its stock markets. However, financing from the internal capital market, especially through the guarantee system provided by other associated firms (the guarantee circle), remains significant for some Chinese...

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Main Authors: Jian, Ming, Xu, Ming
Other Authors: Nanyang Business School
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: 2012
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Online Access:https://hdl.handle.net/10356/95288
http://hdl.handle.net/10220/8416
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Institution: Nanyang Technological University
Language: English
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spelling sg-ntu-dr.10356-952882023-05-19T06:44:41Z Determinants of the guarantee circles : the case of Chinese listed firms Jian, Ming Xu, Ming Nanyang Business School DRNTU::Business China's external capital market has been developing rapidly since the establishment of its stock markets. However, financing from the internal capital market, especially through the guarantee system provided by other associated firms (the guarantee circle), remains significant for some Chinese firms. We analyze the importance associated with the guarantee system in China with a focus on the macro and micro determinants that affect Chinese firms' participation in the guarantee circle. Our findings suggest that both macroeconomic and microeconomic factors have significant impact on a firm's involvement in the guarantee circle. Firms in regions with higher economic growth, less developed banking system and worse legal protection are more likely to receive guarantee from firms associated with the controlling shareholders. On the other hand, firms controlled by the state are less likely to receive guarantee but more likely to provide guarantee, while firms with alternative financing sources are more likely to provide guarantee. Firms within a complex group with more pyramidal layers are more likely to get involved in the guarantee circle, either as a guarantor or a guarantee. Our findings have implications to general guarantee systems with the presence of agency and moral hazard problems. 2012-08-22T09:16:33Z 2019-12-06T19:11:54Z 2012-08-22T09:16:33Z 2019-12-06T19:11:54Z 2011 2011 Journal Article Jian, M., & Xu, M. (2012). Determinants of the guarantee circles: the case of Chinese listed firms. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 20(1), 78–100. https://hdl.handle.net/10356/95288 http://hdl.handle.net/10220/8416 10.1016/j.pacfin.2011.07.001 167613 en Pacific-basin finance journal © 2011 Elsevier B.V. This is the author created version of a work that has been peer reviewed and accepted for publication by Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier. It incorporates referee’s comments but changes resulting from the publishing process, such as copyediting, structural formatting, may not be reflected in this document. The published version is available at: [DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.pacfin.2011.07.001]. application/pdf
institution Nanyang Technological University
building NTU Library
continent Asia
country Singapore
Singapore
content_provider NTU Library
collection DR-NTU
language English
topic DRNTU::Business
spellingShingle DRNTU::Business
Jian, Ming
Xu, Ming
Determinants of the guarantee circles : the case of Chinese listed firms
description China's external capital market has been developing rapidly since the establishment of its stock markets. However, financing from the internal capital market, especially through the guarantee system provided by other associated firms (the guarantee circle), remains significant for some Chinese firms. We analyze the importance associated with the guarantee system in China with a focus on the macro and micro determinants that affect Chinese firms' participation in the guarantee circle. Our findings suggest that both macroeconomic and microeconomic factors have significant impact on a firm's involvement in the guarantee circle. Firms in regions with higher economic growth, less developed banking system and worse legal protection are more likely to receive guarantee from firms associated with the controlling shareholders. On the other hand, firms controlled by the state are less likely to receive guarantee but more likely to provide guarantee, while firms with alternative financing sources are more likely to provide guarantee. Firms within a complex group with more pyramidal layers are more likely to get involved in the guarantee circle, either as a guarantor or a guarantee. Our findings have implications to general guarantee systems with the presence of agency and moral hazard problems.
author2 Nanyang Business School
author_facet Nanyang Business School
Jian, Ming
Xu, Ming
format Article
author Jian, Ming
Xu, Ming
author_sort Jian, Ming
title Determinants of the guarantee circles : the case of Chinese listed firms
title_short Determinants of the guarantee circles : the case of Chinese listed firms
title_full Determinants of the guarantee circles : the case of Chinese listed firms
title_fullStr Determinants of the guarantee circles : the case of Chinese listed firms
title_full_unstemmed Determinants of the guarantee circles : the case of Chinese listed firms
title_sort determinants of the guarantee circles : the case of chinese listed firms
publishDate 2012
url https://hdl.handle.net/10356/95288
http://hdl.handle.net/10220/8416
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